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The “objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” ().

“That objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” Opsahl, d at 421 ().

(“While a defendant has the right to court 17 asks us to infer from his on-the-record discussion with the supervising public defender that he was improperly advised about the availability of substitute counsel.

And “a remark by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense’s theory does not shift the burden of proof.”

“[T]he standard for attorney competence is ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” ().

As with other evidentiary rulings, a district court has “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.”

To be objectively reasonable under the first prong means counsel was “exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.”

The standard of review is an “objective standard” defined as “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. 10 Gassler, (quotation omitted).

“In Minnesota, the standard for attorney competence is representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

The “objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” ().

The district court is afforded “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.” d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993).

The “objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” Opsahl v. 6 State, ().

We afford the district court “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.”

But “a remark by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense’s theory [does] not shift the burden of proof to the defense.” (citing Race, d at 664).

The district court is afforded “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.”

d 62, 67-68 (Minn. 1993).

As with other evidentiary rulings, a district court has “discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect.”

The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.”

An attorney must exercise “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” ().

But “a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defense theory does not improperly shift the burden.” d 62, 69 (Minn. 1993) (“A remark by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense’s theory did not shift the burden of proof to the defense.”).

The objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney in Minnesota is defined as “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills a nd diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would pe rform under similar circumstances.”

18 That objective standard is defined as “r epresentation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Gassler , (quotation omitted).

in support of his argument.

“In Minnesota, the standard for attorney competence is representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

Although Reek cites to State v. Gassler for this proposition, Gassler simply states that “violent crimes lack the impeachment value of crimen falsi [(crimes of falsehood)].” –67 (Minn. 1993).

’” Opsahl v. State , ().

“In Minnesota, the standard for attorney competence is representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Gassler , (quotation omitted).

“[T]he fact that a prior conviction did not directly involve truth or falsity does not mean it has no impea chment value.”

Under the third factor, we recognize that “if the prior conviction is similar to the charged crime, there is a heightened danger that the jury will use the evidence not only for impeachment purposes, but also substantively.” .

See State v. Gassler , (holding that this factor weighed against admission if admitting impeachment evidence meant that appellant’s account of events would not be heard).

To satisfy t he first requirement, Winston must prove that his attorney did not “exercis[e] the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

18 “In Minnesota, the standard for attorney competence is representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he fact that a prior conviction did not directly involve truth or falsity does not mean it has no impeachment value.” 8 (Minn. 1993).

The district court determined that this was a neutral factor because it was not “particularly old.” The third Jones factor considers whether the prior conviction is similar to the charged crime because , if so, “there is a heightened danger that the jury will use the evidence not only for impeachment purposes, but also substantively.”

The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as “r epresentation by an at torney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Gassler , (quotation omitted).

We “presume that the jury followed the [district] court’s instruction.” see State v. Gassler , 7 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that no error occurred where district court instructed the jury that arguments were not evidence).