Cited by

(citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

Courts “consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police had a reasonable basis justifying the stop.”

–89 (Minn. 2000) (noting that this court is “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize [s] that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye”).

Appellate courts give “due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court,” (quotation omitted), and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.

(citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)) .

D E C I S I O N Officers may conduct limited stops to investigate suspected criminal activity when they can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Britton , (quotation omitted).

we examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable.”

Appe llate courts are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” –89 (Minn. 2000).

1868 , 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; State v. Britton , , 87 (Minn. 2000).

Appellate courts “are deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” – 89 (Minn. 2000).

Appellate courts “are deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” -89 (Minn. 2000).

-89 (Minn. 2000) (“We are deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.”).

officers are entitled to rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and we are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” -89 (Minn. 2000).

(), including reason to believe the vehicle owner had an active felony warrant for possession of controlled substances, the condition of the vehicle’s console, the unusually long time it took Lugo to stop, Lugo’s recent presence at a known drug house, his own alleged drug possession close in time to the

And even if the new theory for the stop were properly before us, we still should reject it: because we know that a police officer cannot develop reasonable suspicion based on his own mere hunch, we ought to be certain also that he cannot develop reasonable suspicion based on a caller’s mere hunch, which is all J.P.

officers are entitled to rely on their training and experience to determine whether a particular factor supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and we are “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye.” -89 (Minn. 2000).

“In reviewing a district court’s determinations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, [an appellate court] review[s] questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.”