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22 The rationale for excluding evidence of subjective beliefs from the reasonable-suspicion analysis is not because they are irrelevant, but because “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct.

The rationale for excluding evidence of subjective beliefs from the reasonable-suspicion analysis is not because they are irrelevant, but because “[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” here, because the Commissioner agreed at oral argument that the officers’ statements were relevant to the reasonable suspicion as

(noting that reasonable suspicion is a legal question reviewed de novo).

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979)

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979)

An officer’s subjective good-faith belief that criminal activity is afoot is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion—rather, on review, we must “examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable.”

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979)

5 Officers are allowed “to conduct limited stops to investigate suspected criminal activity when the police can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotation omitted).

7 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

“To justify a stop an officer must be able to state something more than an unarticulated ‘hunch’; the officer must be able to point to something objectively supporting that suspicion.”

In applying this objective standard, appellate courts are “deferential to police officer training and experience,” and a “trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences and deductions ‘that might well elude an untrained person,’” Lugo, d at 487 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

But “we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.”

Appellate courts “review the events surrounding the stop and consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police had a reasonable basis justifying the stop.” d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

In addition, appellate courts give “due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court ,” (quotation omitted) , and we must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations , State v. Klamar , (Minn. 1 Even though revocation of a driver’s license under the implied consent statute is a civil remedy, the exclusionary rule applies to these proceedings.

In evaluating reasonable, articulable suspicion, we are “deferential to police officer training and experience,” and a “trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences and deductions ‘that might well elude an untrained person,’” Lugo, d at 487 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

6 “In reviewing a district court’ s determinations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.”

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000) .

This court reviews “questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.”

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

(stating that a reviewing court is to be “deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye”).

appellant argues that any reasonable suspicion or indication of criminal activity was dispelled at several points in the investigation and that the only justification for the stop was S ergeant Ligneel’s belief that 8 appellant wanted drugs and would not have left without them.

In considering whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances a nd acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” -89 (Minn. 2000) (noting we are deferential to police officer training and experience) .

at 843, but it requires more than an unarticulated hunch

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984)

4 facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).