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The “objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” ().

1 In his pro se brief, Marrison claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of “counsel’s lack of investigation and hiring of an expert witness.” Marrison’s claim is not persuasive because appellate courts “generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” (“[t]he extent of counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy); (rejecting an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim that counsel failed to hire an investigator and interview witnesses).

The “objective standard is defined as ‘representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.’” Opsahl v. 6 State, ().

ict court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has “interpreted this section to re quire the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven, would entitle him to the requested relief.”

As to Thompson’s first argument— that his counsel’s performance was deficient due to a failure to object and ask questions—decisions concerning which questions to ask and which objections to make are considered matters of trial strategy, and appellate courts “generally ‘will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.’” Johnson, d at 657 ().

The reasonableness of an attorney’s performance is judged by an objective standard based on “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. Allwine , n.19 (Minn. 2021), (noting that “[u]nder well-established law,” failure to pursue an alternative perpetrator defense “is a matter of trial strategy that we do not scrutinize” (

(stating appellate courts generally do not review issues of trial strategy and declining to review, in part, the depth of counsel’s investigation into alternative suspects); (concluding in part that whether to cross-examine an expert witness was

(citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928)).

While this court “g enerally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy,” counsel’s failure to inquire about Watkins’s intent to kill R.G.

See Sanchez-Diaz v. State , (stating that appellate courts “will not review ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims based on trial strategy ); (stating that trial strategy includes extent of counsel’s investigation); (“The determination of which defenses to raise represents an attorney’s trial strategy.”).

(concluding that “there were sound strategic reasons for Leake’s counsel not to object to the admission of the hearsay”).

Still, appellate courts’ “reluctance to scrutinize trial tactics is grounded in the public policy of allowing counsel to ha ve the flexibility to represent a client to the fullest extent possible.” Opsahl v. State , (quotation omitted).

See, –05, 107–08 (Minn. 2007) (granting postconviction hearing where jailhouse informant recanted in writing); –24 (Minn. 2004) (granting postconviction hearing based on affidavits that show a witness had recanted).

“Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, our review of decisions by the postconviction court is de novo.”

“Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, our review of decisions by the postconviction court is de novo.”

See Nicks, d at 506 (explaining that courts give trial counsel wide latitude to make decision regarding trial strategy) ; (“We have repeatedly stated that we generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.”).

“Our reluctance to scrutinize trial tactics is grounded in the public policy of allowing counsel to have the fl exibility to represent a client to the fullest extent possible.” (quotation omitted).

“The showing required for a petitioner to receive an evidentiary hearing is lower than that required to receive a new trial.” d 414, 423 (Minn. 20 04).

Accordingly, he asserts that the court should have applied either the Rainer test for newly discovered evidence, d at 695, or the Larrison test for false or recanted 6 testimony, Opsahl v. State , –23 (Minn. 2004), when substantively assessing the claims.

(“We are in no position to second-guess counsel’s decision to focus his strategy on other defenses instead of investigating [other] suspects.”); Jones, d at 236 (“Which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the 7 jury are questions that lie within the proper dis

(quoting Opsahl v. State , ).

A reviewing court generally “will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.”

d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004).

And the supreme court has “repeatedly stated that we generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. State

’” Opsahl v. State , ().

Importantly, “[t]he extent of [trial] counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy.” Strother argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and failed to present certain pieces of evidence to the jury.

2 Even if they were not time-barred, Edwards failed to present any evidence showing that trial counsel’s tactics “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that the outcome would have been different.” The supreme court “ha[s] repeatedly stated that we generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. State

Opsahl v. State , , 421 (Minn. 2004).

y,” and because she did not “accompany[] him during the [presentence investigation] (PSI) process.” As to Henderson’s assert ion that trial counsel unreasonably failed to object to certain testimony and therefore failed to present “the only reasonable argument that [could have] prevailed,” a reviewing court generally “will not review atta cks on counsel’s trial strategy,” Opsahl v. State

A reviewing court “generally will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. 12 State