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Nor is there any need to stay this case when we have repeatedly held, “without a doubt[,] that Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement conduct than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” ( and Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

(“Arrests not resulting in conviction may be considered when the arrest was for an offense of the same general nature.”); (concluding that “the trial court properly considered [Lieberg’s criminal history] as one factor in the totality of relevant circumstances”); (cautioning that “a criminal record .

(cautioning that “a criminal record .

led that when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information.”); Katz , 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); d 199, 207 (Minn. 2005) (stating that a person has no Fourth Amendment protection in anything knowingly disclosed to the p

See 11 “The Fourth Amendment ensures ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend.

(holding that reasonable suspicion is required “to search the sensitive location information in a [hotel] guest registry”); (concluding that reasonable suspicion is required to justify a dog sniff outside a self-storage unit); Fort, d at 419 (determining a search violated the Minnesota Constitution because it was unsupported by reasonable suspicion); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

In addition, “[a] person’s criminal record is among the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.”

Id.; -86 (Minn. 2003) (holding that mere presence of special license plates issued under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.60 (2002) does not support reasonable, articulable suspicion); (stating that a criminal record cannot form the sole basis for probable cause).

crime detection device[s] at random and without reason.” Leonard, d at 155 () (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 305 (“[A] central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

See Olson, d at 95; McCloskey, d at 703

(holding that a drug-detection dog sniff outside of a 12 storage unit is a search under the Minnesota Constitution).

) (concluding that a Terry stop and frisk was unreasonable based solely on an officer’s observation of the defendant speaking with known drug addicts); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that a Terry stop was unreasonable when the officers relied on the fact that defendant “was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users” and the situation “looked suspicious”); (“Because police did not articulate reasonable suspicion that drugs were present in appellant’s storage unit, we hold that t

– 05 (Minn. 2005) (“When examining whether a search was supported by probable cause, the ultimate question is whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

6 (“A person’s criminal record is among the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.”).

This distinction is material: unlike a home, where a person’s privacy expectations “are most heightened,” d 199, 208 (Minn. 2005), the Supreme Court has explained that a passenger’s privacy expectations in a car are “considerably diminished,” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304.

“When examining whether a search was supported by probable cause, the ultimate question is whether there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” -05 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

When making this determination, we look “only to information presented in the [search warrant] affidavit.”

See State v. Carter , (“Statements from citizen witnesses may provide a basis for probable cause when the witness is credible.”); Camp, d at 118-19 (determining that “evasive action” by indi vidual with defendant, when combined with other observations, supported probable cause for arrest).

See, (“Because the error in admitting the seized evidence was prejudicial to appellant, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.”).3 The district court erred in relying on evidence not in the record.

( (stating that “a criminal reco rd, even a ‘long’ one, is best used as ‘corroborative information’ and not as the so le basis for probable cause”)).

-05 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).

“A person’s criminal record is among th e circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.” State v. Carter

See, (holding search of hotel guest registry violated Minn. Const. art I, § 10 because it “provides greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement conduct” than the U.S. Constitution); (holding random use of drug-detection dog violated Minn. Const. art I, § 10); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

An officer must know sufficient facts to articulate “reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test .” State v. Carter

crime detection device[s] at random and without reason.” 7 (quoting 7 (holding that under Minnesota law, “an administrative search warrant need not be supported by individualized suspicion of a code violation when the

Further, “[a] person’s criminal record is among the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.”

In reviewing a warrantless dog sniff, two requirements must be tested: (1) police must be “able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek” to search; and (2) the police must be “lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted.” 2 An officer’s suspicion meets the reasonable, articulable standard based on an “objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test.”

Second, Onyelobi asserts that the dog sniff of the outside of her storage locker was an unlawful search under our decision in State v. Carter

See State v. Carter , , 212 (Minn. 2005).

al history1 and the anonymous tips, indicated that respondent was 1 “A person’s criminal record is among the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant,” however, a criminal record is best used “as corroborative information and not as the sole basis for probable cause.” (quotation omitted).

Probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” -05 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

Vagle’s primary argument on appeal is that the dog sniff conducted by Deputy Lopez and Officer Young was unconstitutional and that “[w]ithout the unconstitutional dog sniff, the search warrant in this case was not properly issued.” See State v. Carter , (holding that information obtained from an unlawful dog sniff could not be used to support a search warrant).

(“A person’s criminal record is among 11 the circumstances a judge may consider when determining whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.”).

“[T]he freshness of the information provided by the witness is an important factor for determining the probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Carter , , 209 (Minn. 2005).