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“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unartic ulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotations omitted).

The reasonable suspicion standard is met when an officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quoting In re Welfare of G.M.

“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been violated, [appellate courts] examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v. T imberlake

This standard is “less de manding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” and is satisfied “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted); see Kansas v. Glover , 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) ( noting that reasonable-suspicion standard requires less proof than probable-cause standard).

An officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop and detention, known as a Terry stop, “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 7 is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (M inn.

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” (quotations omitted).

Reasonable suspic ion is a lower standard than probable cause, but it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted); see also Hoekstra, d at 538-39.

(quotation and citation omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, but it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted); see also Hoekstra, d at 538 -39.

The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high.” State v. Timberlake

The reasonable - suspicion standard is not high but requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Diede, d at 843 ( ).

That said, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).

5 An informant’s tip may provide police with reasonable, articulable suspicion if it “bear[s] indicia of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct sufficiently likely.” -94 (Minn. 2008).

1a (2016); State v. Timberlake , -95 (Minn. 2008).

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).

The reasonable, articulable sus picion standard is satisfied when an officer observes conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” ().

The reasonable-articulable-suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted) .

Burg , ; and State v. Timberlake

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted) .

But reasonable suspicion “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted).

-94 (Minn. 2008); d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.”

“A limited investigative stop of a motor vehicle is a seizure, but it is permissible if the law-enforcement officer making the stop has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity.” (quotation omitted); (noting that an officer must be able to articulate the particular and objective basis to suspect a stopped person of criminal activity).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); (“ The factual basis required to justify an investigative seizure is minimal.”).

But it “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” 6 State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

Under one such exception, a police officer may detain an individual to conduct a “ brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

“Police must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (qu otations omitted).

The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the offic er to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

Reasonable suspicion can be “based on information provided by a reliable informant.”

The state relies on State v. Timberlake , and State v. Williams , as support for its position that the peace-officer language creates an exception and not an element.

without first having obtained a permit to carry the pistol.”

“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been 11 violated, we examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v. Timberlake

Reasonable suspicion exists if the police officer can “articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , ().

State v. Timberlake , d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) ; see also State v. Pike , -22 (Minn. 1996) (noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity ) (quotation omitted).

But it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000)).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake