Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390.

312 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Denarro Jesse Cunningham Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been violated, we examine the specific police conduct at issue.”
State of Minnesota v. Mark Terrance Ross Minn. Ct. App. 2020
The reasonable -suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.”
State of Minnesota v. Robert Francisco Meffert Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unartic ulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Daniel James Deschene Minn. Ct. App. 2020
The reasonable suspicion standard is met when an officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quoting In re Welfare of G.M.
State of Minnesota v. Derek William Jung Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been violated, [appellate courts] examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v. T imberlake
State of Minnesota v. Justin Anthony Kudla Minn. Ct. App. 2020
This standard is “less de manding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” and is satisfied “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted); see Kansas v. Glover , 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) ( noting that reasonable-suspicion standard requires less proof than probable-cause standard).
State of Minnesota v. Marguerita Elizabeth Abujobarah Minn. Ct. App. 2020
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Gregory Vanguilder Minn. Ct. App. 2020
An officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop and detention, known as a Terry stop, “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 7 is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).
State of Minnesota v. Levar Randolph Mitchell Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Christian John Donnelly Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (M inn.
State of Minnesota v. Donn Richard Ganske Minn. Ct. App. 2020
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” (quotations omitted).
Kathleen Margaret Eileen Ochs v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Reasonable suspic ion is a lower standard than probable cause, but it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted); see also Hoekstra, d at 538-39.
State of Minnesota v. Irwin James Sam Minn. Ct. App. 2020
(quotation and citation omitted).
Garrett Thomas Cekalla v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2020
Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause, but it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted); see also Hoekstra, d at 538 -39.
State of Minnesota v. Jomar Londo Haines Minn. Ct. App. 2020
The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high.” State v. Timberlake
Kevin Nelson Birkland v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2020
The reasonable - suspicion standard is not high but requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Diede, d at 843 ( ).
State of Minnesota v. Brian Anthony Varnado Minn. Ct. App. 2020
That said, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).
State of Minnesota v. Heriberto Dominguez Bravo Minn. Ct. App. 2020
5 An informant’s tip may provide police with reasonable, articulable suspicion if it “bear[s] indicia of reliability that make the alleged criminal conduct sufficiently likely.” -94 (Minn. 2008).
State of Minnesota v. Jose Salud Botello Vargas Minn. Ct. App. 2020
1a (2016); State v. Timberlake , -95 (Minn. 2008).
State of Minnesota v. Devon Dennis Carstensen Minn. Ct. App. 2019
An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000)).
State of Minnesota v. Jesse William Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2019
The reasonable, articulable sus picion standard is satisfied when an officer observes conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his experience, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” ().
State of Minnesota v. Shawn Casey Tope Minn. Ct. App. 2019
The reasonable-articulable-suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).
Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high,” but it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” (quotations omitted) .
State v. Hall 931 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 2019
State v. Hall 931 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 2019
Burg , ; and State v. Timberlake
State of Minnesota v. Andrew Erik Heiderscheid Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota v. Davon Keontae Garner Minn. Ct. App. 2019
The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted) .
State of Minnesota v. Zong Lee Minn. Ct. App. 2019
But reasonable suspicion “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Keenon Lamar Bowlds Minn. Ct. App. 2019
-94 (Minn. 2008); d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997).
State of Minnesota v. Cornelius Palmer Minn. Ct. App. 2019
The reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.”
State of Minnesota v. Joshua Alvin Peterson Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“A limited investigative stop of a motor vehicle is a seizure, but it is permissible if the law-enforcement officer making the stop has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity.” (quotation omitted); (noting that an officer must be able to articulate the particular and objective basis to suspect a stopped person of criminal activity).
State of Minnesota v. Paul Vang Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota v. Brendon Scott Vagle Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Addison Roger Creviston-Lerud Minn. Ct. App. 2019
“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); (“ The factual basis required to justify an investigative seizure is minimal.”).
State of Minnesota v. Phillip Joseph Porter Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State of Minnesota v. Vincent Edward Britton Minn. Ct. App. 2019
But it “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” 6 State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Michael Thomas Hesch Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota v. Stephen Jon Unsworth Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Under one such exception, a police officer may detain an individual to conduct a “ brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
State of Minnesota v. Devell Eshawn Warren Minn. Ct. App. 2018
“Police must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (qu otations omitted).
Kurt William Sawyer v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the offic er to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. William Aaron Wozna, III Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota v. Jared Lee Radermacher Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Terry John Ascheman v. Commissioner of Public Safety (A17-1988), and State of Minnesota (A18-0348), vs. Terry John Ascheman Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Reasonable suspicion can be “based on information provided by a reliable informant.”
State v. Black 919 N.W.2d 704 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Black 919 N.W.2d 704 Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The state relies on State v. Timberlake , and State v. Williams , as support for its position that the peace-officer language creates an exception and not an element.
State of Minnesota v. Quentin Laurel Rasmussen Minn. Ct. App. 2018
without first having obtained a permit to carry the pistol.”
State of Minnesota v. Glen Dale Acon Minn. Ct. App. 2018
“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been 11 violated, we examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v. Timberlake
Michael Douglas Holm v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2018
Reasonable suspicion exists if the police officer can “articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).
Eric Michael Deroos v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2018
The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , ().
State of Minnesota v. Zach Wallace Larson Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State v. Timberlake , d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) ; see also State v. Pike , -22 (Minn. 1996) (noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity ) (quotation omitted).