Cited by

( (stating that de minimis error in setting child support is not grounds for remand)).

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); Loth, d at 546; (ignoring error when prejudice was de minimis).

P. 61 (requiring reviewing court to ignore harmless error); (noting that reviewing courts ignore even prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis).

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); (noting that appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis).

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be 6 ignored); (noting that appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis).

Further, a party asserting error has the burden of showing both that prejudice arose from 11 the asserted error, and that the prejudice is substantial, see Hesse v. Hesse , (denying relief when any prejudice was de minimis).

1 “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying 1 “On appeal from a CSM’s ruling, the standard of review is the same as it would be if the decision had been made by a district court.”

3b.; (ignoring prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis).

25, 2003); (citing Eisenschenk).

16, 2010); d 98, 105 (Minn. App. 2009) (same).

The supreme court has held in the family law context that “an adjudication on the merits of an issue is conclusive, and should not be relitigated.” Loo v. Loo , d (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 61 in a family appeal); (noting appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis); (noting appellate courts will not reverse district court if it reached affirmable result for wrong reasons).

DECISION “On appeal from a [child-support magistrate’s] ruling, the standard of review is the same as it would be if the decision had been made by a district court.”

“Findings should assure that the relevant statutory factors have been addressed, satisfy the litigants that their case was fairly resolved, and permit reasoned appellate review.” (“It is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal.”).

168, 171 (Minn. 1976) (stating, in a custody dispute, that findings on the statutory factors are required because they “(1) assure consideration of the statutory factors by the family court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the family court’s custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family court”); (“Findings should assure 5 The parties agree that the third factor, special medical needs, is not relevant to the distric

25, 2003); (citing this aspect of Eisenschenk).

25, 2003); d 98, 104 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting this proposition of Eisenschenk).

“Findings should assure that the relevant statutory factors have been addressed, satisfy the litigants that their case was fairly resolved, and permit reasoned appellate review.”

25, 2003); Hesse v. Hesse , (citing this aspect of Eisenschenk).

(noting, in the context of an initial custody award, that findings of fact should show that the district court considered the relevant factors, allow appellate review of its decision, and assure the parties that the district court fairly reached its decision); (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld in a child- support dispute).

25, 2003); (applying this aspect of Eisenschenk).

the parents were awarded roughly equal amounts of 7 parenting time, but the father did not exercise two weeks of parenting time during a vacation period.

Hesse v. Hesse , Brazinsky v. Brazinsky

(noting that a party 8 cannot complain about their own mistake).

The district court must make findings to “permit 5 reasoned appellate review” and to ensure that “the relevant statutory factors have been addressed.” ().

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); (applying rule 61 in a family appeal); Hesse v. Hesse , (noting that appellate courts ignore prejudicial error when the prejudice is de minimis); see also Katz v. Katz , (noting that appellate courts will not reverse a district court if it reached an affirmable result for the wrong reasons).

(stating, in the context of a dispute about a parenting-time expense adjustment, that the relevant amount of parenting time is “the percentage of parenting time scheduled 6 under an existing court order, regardless of whether the parent exercises the full amount of court-ordered parenting t

(interpreting a prior version of the parenting-expense-adjustment statute de novo).

(citing this aspect of Rosenfeld).

25, 2003); (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court declined to make findings on the parties’ expenses in child-support case when nonmoving party failed to submit her expenses to the court).

(“A court may take judicial notice of the course of the calendar.”); (“An appellate court may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on ap peal.” (quotation omitted)).

16, 2010) ; see also Hesse v. Hesse , (concluding de minimis change in expenses did not warrant a parenting-time-expense adjustment of child support) ; (refusing to remand for de minis error in child-support calculation).

71 (Minn. 1976) (stating, in a custody dispute, that findings on the statutory factors are required because 16 they “(1) assure consideration of the statutory f actors by the family court; (2) facilitate appellate review of the family court’s custody decision; and (3) satisfy the parties that this important decision was carefully and fairly considered by the family court”); (citing this aspect of Rosenfeld in a parenting-time dispute).