Cited by

The opinion that the blood on Young’s shoes was human blood, while undisclosed, is also a reasonable inference given 12 –41 (Minn. 2012), in which a plurality of our court concluded that the State’s intimidation of a defendant’s expert witness violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense.

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

Kingbird argues that he is entitled to a new trial “in the interests of justice.” the case cited by Kingbird, the supreme court held that, under exceptional circumstances, it may exercise its supervisory powers and grant a new trial in the interests of justice even when there is no showing of actual prejudice.

health condition and was indigent; (2) he had retained expert witnesses who would offer testimony at trial disputing the state’s theory on the child’s cause of death and, instead, opine that the child’s subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhages were caused by pre-existing medical conditions; (3) he has a due-process right pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) d 814 (Minn. 2012), to present expert witnesses to counter the state’s experts; and (4) expert testimony is necessary to his def

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the [ district] court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

DECISION “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief,” as is the case here, “we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft , d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012).

DECISION “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft , 6 6 The state did not file a respondent’s brief.

Treu also argues that he should be granted a new trial “in the interest of justice.” In the exercise of its supervisory role over the trial courts to prevent the recurrence of prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, the Minnesota Supreme Court has, on occasion, awarded a new trial “in the interests of justice” in “exceptional circumstances.” See

d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012).

And “[w]hen a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, [appellate courts] review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that [they] apply on direct appeal.”

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decision s using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

(acknowledging that the supreme court’ s “power to reverse prophylactically or in the interests of justice comes from [its] power to supervise [district] courts” (quotation omitted)); n.6 (Minn. 2006) ( “The court of appeals does not exercise supervisory powers

But when, as here, “a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, [appellate courts] review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that [they] apply on direct appeal.”

7 “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

“An attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014); (Anderson, J., concurring) (explaining that deference to counsel “is unwarranted” when counsel’s error did not result from strategy, “but was instead the result of a misunderstanding of facts or law or an inexcusable oversight” (citing Kim

XIV; 7 –39 (Minn. 2012) (recognizing the right to a complete defense under Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); -39 (Minn. 2012).

Roberts initially filed a direct appeal, followed by a motion for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, requiring this court to “review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that [is] appl[ied] on direct appeal.” d 814, 836 (Minn. 2012); see Minn. R. Crim.

(acknowledging that the supreme court’s power to reverse “prophylactically or in the interests of justice” comes from its power to supervise trial courts (quotation omitted)); Ramey, d at 302 n.6 (stating that the court of appeals does not exercise supervisory powers that are reserved fo

But when, as here, “a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

DECISION “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the [district] court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

However, “[a]lthough [appellate] scru tiny of defense attorneys is, and must continue to be, highly deferential, [this] deference has limits.” State v. Beecroft , (Anderson, G. Barry, J., concurring) (quotation and citation omitted).

See State v. Beecroft , State v. Petersen , rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

( acknowledging that the supreme court’s power to reverse “prophylactically or in the interests of justice” comes from its power to supervise trial courts (quotation omitted)); n.6 (Minn. 2006) (stating that the court of appeals does not exercise supervisory p

Appellate courts “will not typically disturb the strategic or tactical decisions of trial counsel.”

DECISION “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

5 “When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court ’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.”

“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue postco nviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft