Cited by

See Firkus, d at 488-89 (excluding “four discrete facts [the defendant] argue[d] should be included in the circumstances proved because the jurors were required to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, which includes evidence contradicting these facts”); -71 (Minn. 2011) (stating that defendant’s testimony that conflicts with the state’s evidence that supports the verdict is not considered when identifying the circumstances proved).

at 486-87 (excluding four discrete facts the defendant argued should be included in the circumstances proved because the jurors were required to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, which includes evidence contradicting these facts) ; see also State v. Hawes , -71 7 (Minn. 2011) (stating that defendant’s testimony that conflicts with the state’s evidence that supports the verdict is not considered when identifying the circumstances proved).

favor of the jury’s verdict,” which results in “a subset of facts that constitute ‘the circumstances proved.’ ” Harris, d at 600 ().

In doing so, we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute ‘the circumstances proved.’” d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017) ().

- 71 (Minn. 2011) (rejecting the part of a defendant’s testimony that conflicted with the state’s evidence supporting the verdict); see also Colgrove, d at 150 (holding that we must disregard those circumstances that are inconsistent with the jury’s verdict).

we do not consider [that] testimony when identifying the circumstances proved.” -71 (Minn. 2011).

In doing so, we “defer” to the factfinder’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

In doing so, we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute ‘the circumstances proved.’” Harris, d at 600 ().

To be guilty of aiding and abetting, “the defendant does not need to have participated actively in the actual commission of the crime.” d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011).

-71 (Minn. 2011) (noting that, when evaluating convictions based on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts do not consider testimony rejected by the jury).

because even in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the [fact-finder] is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.” (citations omitted).

To apply the circumstantial-evidence test, we first “identify the circumstances proved” and, in doing so, “defer” to the factfinder’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” (quotation omitted).

Under the circumstantial-evidence test, the defense’s proposed inference must lead to a rational hypothesis “inconsistent with guilt,” or, stated differently, a “rational hypothesis of innocence,” d 659, 669 (Minn. 2011).

The requisite state of mind for accomplice liability can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the “defendant[’]s presence at the scene of the crime, [a] close association with the principal before and after the crime, [a] lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and defendant[’]s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” (internal quotation marks omitted) ().

We follow a two-step process in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a case based on circumstantial evidence, and “the same standard of review [applies to] bench trials and [to] jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,”

Because the appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, it “must assume the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” C.J.W.J., d at 334 (d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989)).

we do not consider [the defendant’s] testimony when identifying the circumstances proved.” -71 (Minn. 2011).

See State v. Hawes , -71 (Minn. 2011) (declining to consider appellant’s testimony in which he denied involvement in the crime because it conflicted with the state’s evidence supporting a guilty verdict).

State v. Hawes , d 659, 669 –70 (Minn. 2011) (noting that testimony contrary to the verdict is not a circumstance proved).

Assuming that the jury credited the testimony of th e state’s witnesses, and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances proved are as follows.

Stated differently, “we construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume th e jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

The state must prove that the defendant “had knowledge of the crime and intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).

A. Circumstances Proved Assuming that the jury credited the testimony of the state’s witnesses and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, see State v. Hawes , d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011), we identif y the following circumstances proved.

“In circumstantial evidence cases, the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent 7 with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

See id.; -71 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that, because defendant’s testimony conflicts with the state’s evidence that supports the verdict, the supreme court would not consider testimony when identifying the circumstances proved).

(when determining the circumstance proved, “we disregard testimony that is inconsistent with the verdict.”) ; Silvernail, (we assume the jury disbelieved the defense witnesses).