Cited by

–01 (Minn. 2015) (determining that the defendant was not prejudiced because it was not reasonably likely that the jury was split on which acts they believed satisfied the element).

isions, and in light of the jury unanimity requirement under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 1(5), we now consider the first question presented here: Is a defendant in a Minnesota state court prosecution entitled to a specific-unanimity jury 10 In 2015, we again addressed whether the lack of a

(stating that “courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks” (quotation omitted)).

(“Denial of a requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

(“The unanimity problems created by the State’s vague drafting of the complaint could have easily been avoided” by a different charging decision.).

(“Generally, criminal sexual conduct offenses require only an intent to sexually penetrate, unless additional mens rea requirements are expressly provided.”).

“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even when a constitutional violation is alleged.”

In the criminal context, erroneous exclusion of defense evidence requires reversal unless the error “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

An error is prejudicial “if there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Id.; see, -302 (Minn. 2015) (upholding conviction because there was no reasonable likelihood, given the record evidence, that the jury’s verdict would have been different had the district court not plainly erred by omitting a specific-unanimity instruction); -84 (Minn. 1999) (rev

4725 v. City of Brainerd, (quotation omitted); (stating that “courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” (quotation omitted)).

Such evidence also may be admitted if its admission “is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer 10 evidence in his own defense.” (quotation omitted).

See Griller, d at 741; (concluding that “any error did not affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights” because “i t is not reasonably likely that the district court’s failure to provide a specific-unanimity jury instruction significantly affected the verdict”).

In a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, evidence of a n alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct is generally inadmissible under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 and Minnesota Statutes section 609.347 (2022), also known as the “rape -shield law.” 3

14 the jury might otherwise infer that the defendant was the source.”); (stating that in cases where a defendant asserts that the victim “fabricated the sexual conduct,” aspects of a victim’s sexual history may be introduced into evidence to establish “a sour ce of knowledge or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances in which lack of knowledge is the likely i

When “it is not reasonably likely that the district court’s [errors] significantly affected the verdict, we conclude that any error did not affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights.” State 12 v. Wenthe

The alleged error in this case is that the district court did not go further and allow 10 addressed that doctrine in a case that is procedurally similar to this case:

1(d) (2020); (“Generally, criminal sexual conduct offenses require only an intent to sexually penetrate, unless additional mens rea requirements are expressly provided.”).

A district court’s “[d]enial of a requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”

“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even when a constitutional violation is alleged.”

“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, even when a constitutional violation is alleged.”

-05 (Minn. 2015) (holding that, when the statute does not include a mens rea requirement, the court will not supply one because courts cannot supply what the legislature either purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks).

1( d)); State v. Wenthe , (“Generally, criminal sexual conduct offenses require only an intent to sexually penetrate .

(“Generally, criminal sexual conduct offenses require only an intent to sexua lly penetrate, unless additional mens rea requirements are expressly provided.”).

In a criminal-sexual-conduct prosecution, “evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor shall any reference to su ch conduct be made in the presence of the jury,” unless an enumerated exception applies and “the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature.” State v. Wenthe , (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd.

First, “[t]he rape-shield law applies equally to evidence offered by the prosecution and the defense.” -07 (Minn. 2015).

Price asserts that “a court not requiring unanimity when the State’s evidence permits the jury to convict on an unproven factual theory is plain error.” in support of that argument.