Cited by

Cf. State v. Salyers , (discu ssing firearm possession).

1b(a) (2018); (recognizing the mens rea element ).

37 (Minn. App. 2014) , aff’d, 1 Similarly, in State v. Watson, the defendant was convicted of ineligible person in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm on which the serial number had been obliterated.

(“[A] person may possess property even if another person owns that property.”).

Possession “may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

8 (d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975)).

1(2) (2016).3 “Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015).

The pur pose of the constructive-possession doctrine is to include within the firearm -possession statute those cases “where the inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the [firearm] and did not abandon his possessory interest in the [firearm] but rather continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” (quotation omitted).

d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015).

Although misleading the jury about the law is plain error and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, State v. Salyers , aff’d, it is presumed that juries follow instructions.

3; aff’d, State v. Winbush , n.3 (Minn. App. 2 018), review denied (Minn. May 29, 2018).

Minn Stat. § 609.67, subds.

We seek to “determine whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” (quotations omitted).

(holding that the circumstan tial-evidence standard of review need not be applied when direct evidence est ablishes the challenged element).

See State v. Salyers , , 160 (Minn. 2015) (establishing constructive possession by direct evidence); State v. Sam , , 832 (Minn. App. 2015) (establishing constructive possession by circumstantial evidence).

5 “Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

7 Salyers, (holding that heightened standard of review was not applicable because the challenged element was established by direct evidence).

See Harris, d at 601 -02; State v. Salyers , -60 (Minn. 2015).

d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015).

(applying the same standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to both bench and jury trials).

“Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

“Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

(declining to apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review because direct evidence sufficiently supported the guilty verdict).

d 156, 161 (Minn. 2015).

The issue for a reviewing court is “whether the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” (citations omitted).

See State v. Salyers , d 156, 161 (Minn. 2015).

7 (quoting State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105, ).

2(a)(1) (2014), which criminalizes possession of “one or more mixtures of a total weight of six grams or more containing cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine.” Possession of contraband “may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”

n.3 (Minn. 2015) (“[A] person may possess property even if another person owns that property.”).

-40 (Minn. 2016); -61 (Minn. 2015); n.2 (Minn. 2010).

at 105, d at 611; State v. Salyers , (n oting that Minnesota courts “have consistently applied Florine’s analysis as the test for constructive possession”).

The constructive-possession analysis required by Florine is “necessarily fact driven.” State v. Salyers , (quotations omitted).