Cited by

deviat[ed] from a legal rule.” State v. Onyelobi , Barrow made one “leading” objection related to the text-message testimony.

at 726 (citing State v. Reiners , -34 (Minn. 2003)); n.11 (Minn. 2016); (citing Onyelobi for this principle).

1 First, the objecting party must make a prima facie showing that the other party exercised its peremptory challenge based on race.

“It is well-settled that mere removal of a member of a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” State v. Onyelobi ¸ (quotation omitted).

If 7 “more than one police officer is involved in an investigation, the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause existed for an arrest.” n.5 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

“[G]enerally [,] a district court should make its rulings sequentially at the conclusion of its consideration of each prong, including whether the challenger has established a prima facie case, before considering prongs two and three.” n.11 (Minn. 2016).

The supreme court has stated that it is “optimal procedure” for a district court to “make its rulings sequentially at the conclusion of its consideration of each prong[.]” n.11 (Minn. 2016) (d 717, 725 (Minn. 2007)).

State v. Onyelobi , 342-43 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) .

upon ‘proof of disproportionate impact upon the racial group, e.g., the prosecutor totally excluded all blacks from the venire.’ State v. 16 Onyelobi, ().

“[T]he fact that the prospective juror is a member of a racial minority, alone, does not raise an inference that the exclusion was based on 6 race.” Black, d at 711 (quotation omitted); (“It is well-settled that mere removal of a member of a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” (quotation omitted)).

(declining to address whether Rosemond is “consistent with Minnesota’s 34 accomplice liability law” because the Court’s holding did not help the defendant).

And “[t]he quantum of proof required for a finding of probable cause is more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” (quotation omitted).

The level of proof required to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest is “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” (quotation omitted).

To es tablish probable cause there must be “more than mere susp icion but less than th e evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Onyelobi , (quotation omitted).

-43 (Minn. 2016) (“Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, we review the pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Milton , (“We review the district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.”).

1 The facts of the murder are set forth in greater detail in our opinion in State v. Onyelobi (Onyelobi I), –42 (Minn. 2016).

476 U.S. at 96–98; (noting that the three-step process “determine[s] whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge was motivated by racial discrimination ”).

It exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” (emphasis and quotation omitted).

To do so, he “must show that a member of a protected racial class has been excluded from the jury and that the 5 circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” Adams, d at 329 (emphasis added); (“It is well-settled that mere removal of a member of a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” (quotation omitted)).

The objecting party must show two things: “(1) that on e or more members of a racial minority has been peremptorily excluded and (2) that circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race .” (quotations omitted).

Probable cause exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” State v. Onyelobi , (emphasis omitted) (quotation om itted).

Probable cause exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” (-48 (Minn. 2007)).

Because Daniels is challenging a jury instruction, he must satisfy “the ‘heavy burden’ of showing ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.’” n.18 (Minn. 2016) ().

A lawful arrest requires probable cause, which exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” (quotation omitted and emphasis removed).

“A seizure by warrantless arrest is reasonable if it is supported by probable cause.”

d at 202 (explaining that, when the district court "failed to follow the proper procedure at step two of the Batson analysis-that is, rather than determining whether each of the prosecutor's reason was race-neutral on its face , the district court analyzed whether the reasons were credible[-,]" we did not need to defer to the district court's step-two determinations); see also State v. Onyelobi , , 347 n.11 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that the district court's failure to make its rulings sequential

State v. Onyelobi , -43 (Minn. 2016).

State v. Onyelobi ( Onyelobi I )

476 U.S. at 96–98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723–24; Minn. R. Crim.

A district c ourt abuses its discretion “if the jury instructions confuse , mislead, or materially misst ate the law.” (quotations omitted).

6a(3); State v. Onyelobi , .

A district court abuses its discretion “if the jury instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstat e the law.” State v. Onyelobi , (quotation omitted).

“Probable cause exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the tot ality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime.” d 334, 343 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).