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(“We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”).

In addition, appellate courts generally “will not review attacks on counsel’s trial strategy,” and “decisions about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy,” (quotation omitted).

Under this test, Davis must show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “a reasonable possibility exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” (quotation omitted).

d 585, 592 (Minn. 2017); see also State v. Nicks , (“We give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client.”).

Under this test, Banks must show that “ (1) his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable possibility exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” (quotation omitted).

“We review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.”

If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, [an appellate court] need not consider the other requirement.”

See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694-98 (1984) (treating “reasonable probability” in reviewing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as mixed question of law and fact); (stating that appellate courts review district court’s application of Strickland’s reasonable-probability test de novo because it involves mixed question of law and fact).

We presume that counsel’s performance was reasonable, id., and generally do not review ineffective- assistance claims that are based on trial strategy

d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (stating that courts “give trial counsel wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client”).

We “review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.”

“To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance 21 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” (quotations omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687- 88, 692.

To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the appellant must show that “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would be different, but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Mosley , (quotation omitted).

“A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” (quotation omitted).

“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider the other requirement.”

“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, we need not consider the other requirement.” d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).

“To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance fell below 14 an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692.

5 “We review a [postconviction] court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.”

9 Appellate courts “review a district court’s application of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.”

“To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his attorney’s 16 performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” (quotations omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, [a court] need not consider the other requirement.”

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: “(1) [their] attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonablen ess, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Mosley , (quotation omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687- 88.

The evaluation of a court’s application of the Strickland two-prong test is reviewed de novo “because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” (citation omitted).