Cited by

(“A [district] court’s decision regarding permissive, consecutive sentences will not be disturbed unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”).

See McInnis, d at 880, 892–94 (involving seven shots toward two victims); 397–98 (Minn. 1998) (involving seven shots toward six victims); State v. Marquardt , (involving two shots toward seven victims); (involving 20 shots toward three victims).

And “the effect of [an] assault on the victim is frequently introduced at trial as evidence of the defendant’s intent.”

Intent may also be inferred “from events occurring before and after the crime,” and “the effect of the assault on the victim.”

See Cooper, d at 179 (stating that a fact-finder may infer that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions); (“When an assailant fires numerous shots from a semiautomatic weapon into a home, it may be inferred that the assailant intends to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to those within the home.”).

An appellate court “review[s] criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.”

(although a defendant’s intent is the focal point of proving an assault-fear claim, “the effect of the assault on the victim is frequently introduced as trial evidence of the defendant’s intent”).

“An assault-fear offense ‘does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.’” (d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998)).

d 393, 396 (Minn. 1998) (“ A factfinder evaluates the credibility of witnesses and need not credit a defendant ’s exculpatory testimony”).

See, - 97 (Minn. 2 Fifth-degree assault also occurs if an actor “intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.

“We review criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.”

The doctrine is most frequently applied in cases “where the accused intends to kill one person, but, because of bad aim, kills another.” n.1 (Minn. 1998).

- 98 (Minn. 1998) (rejecting the argument that imposition of multiple sentences , by itself, constitute s unfair exaggeration).

Anderson correctly notes that in many circumstances, we defer to district courts in the exercise of sentencing discretion because a district court 5 “judge sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including sentencing, and the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the offender’ s conduct and weigh sentencing options.”

is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options.” State v. Hough

See State v. Hough , (explaining that evidence of effect on victim is frequently introduced but “not essential”).

“A trial court’s decision regarding permissive, consecutive sentences will not be disturbed unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

1989), State v. Hough , -97 (Minn. 1998); -69 (Minn. App. 2017).

“An appellate court will not interfere wi th a [district] court’s discretion in sentencing unless the sentence is di sproportionate to the offense.” State v. Hough

Appellate courts “review criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.” State v. Hough , 5

d 393, 398 (Minn. 1998).

(affirming sentence because defendant “has made no such showing” that sentence exaggerates criminality).

See State v. Hough , (“When an assailant fires numerous shots fr om a semiautomatic w eapon into a home, it may be inferred that the assailant intends to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death to those within the home.”).

7 We recognize that the district court “sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including sentencing, and the [district court] judge is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options.”

(“A trial court’s decision regarding permissive, consecutive sentences will not be disturbed unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”).

“The crime is in the act done with intent to cause fear, not in whether the intended result is achieved.”

But it “does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.” d 393, 395 (Minn. 1998).

See State v. Hough , (noting that the district court “is in t he best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options”).

its discretion by denying his request for a downward-dispositional departure on his third-degree criminal -sexual- conduct conviction.2 D E C I S I O N “A [district court] judge sits with a unique perspective on all stages of a case, including sentencing, and the [district court] judge is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options.”

(noting that the district court “is in the best position to evaluate the offender’s conduct and weigh sentencing options”).

State v. Hough , , 396 (Minn. 1998).

An appellate court “review[s] criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.”

See State v. Hough , 5 To determine whether a sentence unfairly exaggerates the crimi nality of a defendant’s conduct, appellate c ourts examine sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to consider whether t he sentence is commensurate wit h culpability.

An appellate court “review[s] criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.”

State v. Fleck , -09 (Minn. 2012) ; State v. Hough , 5-96 (Minn. 1998).