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“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures “is identical to the 11 provision against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” see also Wiebesick, d at 157 (reaffirming “that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is textually identical in all relevant respects to Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution” (quotation omitted)).

5 erred in suppressing— or not suppressing—the evidence.”

14 an officer locates what he immediately and without further manipulation has probable cause to believe is evidence of a crime, then the officer may legally seize that evidence.” (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993)).

We commented on this kind of search in State v. Harris, where we held that “[w]hen an officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a person he has seized is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective pat-down search of the person’s outer clothing in order to ascertain whether the person is armed.”

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

A person is seized “if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” (quotation omitted).

But “[n]ot all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures.”

If, during the course of such a search, “an officer locates what he immediately and without further manipulation has probable cause to believe is evidence of a crime, then the officer may legally seize that evidence.”

But “[n]ot all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures.”

Suppression of Evidence When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court “may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

Further, 6 the justification for the suspicion generally cannot solely be based on conduct consistent with the “activities of any multitude of innocent persons.” -01 (Minn. 1999).

To establish that an individual voluntarily consented to a search, the onus is on the state to prove that the consent was given freely and was “manifestly voluntary.” d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily).

Further, the justification for the suspicion generally cannot be based solely on conduct consistent with the “activities of any multitude 6 of innocent persons.” -01 (Minn. 1999).

Generally, a person is not seized “merely because a police officer approaches him in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.” (explaining that generally a person is not seized when “an officer .

And “[a] person generally is not seized merely because a police officer approaches him in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.” Klotz v. Comm’r of Pub.

The following circumstances could indicate that a seizure has taken place: “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (quotation omitted).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

(“We review de novo a trial court’s determination of probable cause as it relates to a warrantless search”); (holding that when facts are not in dispute, this court reviews a suppression order de novo to determine whether police articulated an adequate basis for the search).

Safety, (“It is not a seizure for an officer simply to approach and talk to a person standing in a public place or to a driver seated in an already stopped car.”); -99 (Minn. 1999) (“A person generally is not seized merely because a police officer approaches him in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.”) ; State v. Reese , - 23 (Minn. App. 1986) (reversing suppression of evidence on the basis that, pursuant to Vohnoutka, “[i]n t

4 “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing— or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“Not all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures.”