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Suppression of Evidence “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” 98 (Minn. 1999) ().

(concluding that voluntary consent was given based, in part, on the fact that appellant responded to the request to search “promptly” and “unequivocally”); 880-81 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search of his wallet

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing — the evidence.”

An officer’s decision to seize a person may be justified based on the totality of the circumstances, and an officer “may draw inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person.” (quotation omitted).

“A person generally is not seized merely because a police officer approaches him in a public place or in a parked car and begins to ask questions.” (concluding “that the trooper’s approach to Klamar’s [parked] vehicle to check on the welfare of its occupants was not a seizure”).

Under Minnesota law, a seizure occurs when “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” (citing Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (other citation omitted).

“Whether consent was voluntary is 10 determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.” d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

The standard for reasonable susp icion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticul arized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotations omitted); (an officer “may draw infere nces and deductions that might elude an untrained person”).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independen tly review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

(recognizing that “a person ha s been seized if in view of all the 5 We conclude that these circumstances provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for the deputy to seize Brown for purposes of an investigatory stop.

See State v. Koppi , State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

When reviewing a district court’s decision denying a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court “may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred.”

see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).

5 “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppr ess evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

“Under the Minnesota Constitution, ‘a person has been seized if in view of all the circ umstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.’”4 3 As a threshold matter, we agree with the parties that the state has satisfied the requirements for review of the pretrial order.

DECISION “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing —or not suppressing —the evidence.” State v. Harris

(explaining that “any evidence that is the fruit of the [unlawful] seizure is suppressible”).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing —or not suppressing—the evidence.”

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppre ss evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

To establish that an individual voluntarily consented to a search, the onus is on the state to prove that the consent was given freely and was “manifestly voluntary.” See State v. Shellito , (holding that state must show by a preponderance of the ev idence that consent was given freely and voluntarily).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing —or not suppressing—the evidence.”

A seizure occurs “when [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968)); see also State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on 4 motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing —or not suppressing —the evidence.”

Under the Minnesota Constitution, which o ffers more protection than the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have belie ved that he or she was neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” 3 (); see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

Further, Officer Baldwin’s use of a “firm and commanding voice” in a position of authority does not rise to the level of a “tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (quotatio n omitted).

“Whether consent was voluntary is 5 determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said a nd how it was said.” (quotation omitted).

gues that when Officer Baumeister seized him, he only knew five things: “an employee said a person was looking in a car, Anderson was leaving the area on a bike, his eyes were wide, he was moving his hands, and he was speaking rapidly.” A seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” (quotation omitted).

d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999) (“A decision of the Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the U.S. Constitution that is identical to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of persuasive authority to this court.”).

For example, we concluded that a passenger on a bus was not subjected to an unlawful search and seizure under the Minnesota Constitution when police officers conducted drug interdiction operations by boarding interstate buses to search for people transporting controlled substances.

“The officer need not be absolutely cer tain of the possibility of criminal activity, but he cannot satisfy the test of reasonableness by relying on an inchoate and unparticularized suspicio n or hunch.” State v. Schrupp , review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001) (quotation omitted); (“ A hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, cannot provide the basis for an investigatory stop.”).

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 225 -26, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 6 2046-47 (1973); State v. Diede , 7 State v. Harris , -03 (Minn. 1999).

State v. Harris , d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted).