Cited by

“Whether consent was voluntary is determined by examining ‘the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encount er, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.’” (citation omitted).

The officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[.]’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)

3 “Seizure occurs when the office r, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re strained the liberty of a citizen.” (quotation omitted).

ere violated, and the district court erred by denying his suppression motion, because he was misl ed about his obligation to undergo the PBT and HGN test.1 “When reviewing pretrial orders on mo tions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

(stating that officer “may draw inferences and deductions that might elude an untrained person”).

Rather, a s eizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” (quotation omitted).

dog sniff of [his] car.” Bolkema asks this court to “overturn the denial of [his] motion to suppress and reverse his conviction.” 1 In reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress evidence, this court “independently review[s] the facts and determine[s], as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

App. 1997) (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds

ANALYSIS “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

To determine whether consent is voluntary, courts look at “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” (quotation omitted).

Indeed, the officer’s suspicion must be more than the product of “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds

See Askerooth, d at 364 (concluding that each incremental intrusion during a stop must be justified by the circumstances that made the stop permissible, and an intrusion not closely related to those circumstances 6 invalidates the search or seizure unless independent probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists); see also State v. Harris , (explaining that pat search was justified by unusual nervousness, secretive movements, and attempt to conceal object).

A district court determines voluntariness of consent by taking into consideration “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” (quotation omitted).

“Whether consent was voluntary is determined by examining the totality of the ci rcumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” (quotation omitted).

because the other person to the encounter is a police officer.” (quotation omitted).

see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1876 (1980)

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

See State v. Harris , , 104 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct.

Although a law -enforcement officer may seize a person based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, “[n]ot all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures.”

9 circumstances, including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is, and what was said and how it was said.” (quotation omitted).

D E C I S I O N “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“Not all encounters between the police and citizens constitute seizures.” State v. Harris

5 suppressing—or not suppre ssing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matt er of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

absolutely certain of the possibility of criminal activity, but he cannot satisfy the test of reasonableness by relying on an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968)) (quotation marks omitted) , review denied (Minn. July 24, 2001) ; see also State v. Harris , (“ A hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, c annot provide the ba sis for an investigatory stop.”).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

backpack located inside the car were lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.1 When reviewing a pretrial order suppre ssing evidence, we “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing— or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

In reviewing a district court’s pretrial suppression ruling, “we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whethe r the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppre ssing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [this court] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

(internal citations omitted).

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris

App. 2012) (quoting State v. Harris , ).