Cited by

“[A]ppellate courts must look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” “If the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citation omitted).

In addition, “it is reversible error in Minnesota to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict,” which means that a district court “can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citations omitted).

A district court cannot instruct a jury that a case must be decided or let a jury “believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citation omitted).

A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citations omitted).

(“Looking to the whole of the evidence on which the jury based its verdict, we [conclude] that the verdict was surely unattributable to [the witness’s] pre-trial identification.”).

“A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (- 73 (Minn. 1973) -10 (Minn. 1994)).

6 Opportunity to view the perpetrator Whether a witness had a good opportunity to view a perpetrator is evaluated based on the amount of time that the witness viewed the perpetrator, d 903, 913 (Minn. 1996), and if the witness saw the perpetrator “during daylight hours from relatively close range.” Ostrem, d at 922.

( stating that analysis of the first prong of the Ostrem test is unnecessary when the state admits that the identification procedure was suggestive).

(stating that conducting the first part of the Ostrem analysis was unnecessary because “the state admits that [the identification] was suggestive”).

This court must “look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” State v. Jones , (stating reviewing court must consider several factors, including importance of testimony, 15 its cumulative nature, whether there is corroborating or contradicting evidence, extent of cross-examination, and strength of the prosecution’s case) .

[but] [t]he court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” -12 (Minn. 1996) ().

An error is harmless “[i]f the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error.”

(stating that appellate courts will look to the nature, complexity, and length of the trial to determine the reasonableness of requiring the jury to continue its deliberations).

” State v. Jones , (citations omitted).

a. Opportunity to vie w the perpetrator Whether a witness had a good opportunity to view a perpetrator is evaluated based on the amount of time that the witness could see the perpetrator, d 903, 913 (Minn. 1996) (holding that this factor cut against adm ission where the witness had only a brief opportunity to view the perpetrators), the adequacy of the lighting and the witness’s distance from the perpetrator, Ostrem, d at 922 (holding that this factor favored admission when the witness saw the p

(concluding that a statement was not against penal interest when it was designed to “thr[o]w the bulk of the responsibility for the more serious offenses” onto another, even though the statement also implicated the declarant in a crime).

See State v. Jones , , 912 (Minn. 1996) ("[I]t is *272 reversible error in Minnesota to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict....

A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citations omitted).

First, in State v. Jones, police could only obtain general descriptions of two men involved in a shooting, indicating their build, skin tone, and gender, .

Even if we were to find that the district court erred by admitting the identification evidence, “a finding of constitutional error in a criminal trial does not require a new trial if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.”

17, 1986), (concluding that victim identification was unreliably based on “vague description” of defendant).

687 (Spreigl evidence of defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was not admissible to show motive in prosecution for criminal sexual misconduct) , with State v. Black , d 208, 215 (Minn. 1980) (upholding admission of Spreigl evidence to show that motive for murder was to silence witness on outstanding robbery charges a gainst defendant) , n.4 (Minn. 1996).

Ford, d at 227; see also State v. Jones , n.4 (Minn. 1996) (“ Prior to [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] adoption, in Ford, of the Williamson reasoning, a Minnesota trial court was under no obligation to attempt to parse out a witness’ or co-defendant’s statement to separate inculpatory from noninculpa tory portions of the statement.”).

Accordingly, “it is reversible error in Minnesota to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict.”

A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citations omitted).

to argue that “simply reinstructing the jury on CRIMJIG 3.04 after instructions using the mandatory language of CRIMJIG 1.02 was not a cure-all.” His reliance is misplaced: the language to which he refers in the Jones instruction, “giving the proper charge, CRIMJIG 3.04, when the jury reache[s] a dead

(affirming the district court’s finding that the defendant forfeited his right to confront the victim when she refused to testify because he intimidated her into silence), n.4 (Minn. 1996).

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972)

“A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that 6 a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (citing State v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, ).

can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.”