Cited by

State v. Wukawitz , -22 (Minn. 2003).

“[ W]hether the state will be unduly prejudiced depends on the facts of each case.”

The requirement that a guilty plea be intelligent “insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” (quotation omitted).

d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003).

See Rhodes, d at 327 (distinguishing cases in which “the conditional release term was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing or included in the initial sentence”); -25, 529 (Minn. 2003) (stating that the court’s “holding is limited to those situations where the original sentence did not include conditional release” and distinguishing cases “in which the district court failed to impose conditional release at sentencing and later amended the sentence to add the conditional

and Jumping Eagle, d at 44, to argue that “when a plea agreement calls for a sentence without a conditional-release term, the addition of a conditional -release term violates the 5 agreement, and the plea must be withdrawn.” But these cases are factually distinguished and, instead, Rh

When reviewing a plea agreement and its conditions, this court looks at “what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” 7 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).

- 25 (Minn. 2003) (allowing for withdrawal of plea when the district court amended the initial sentencing order to impose a period of conditional release that was not included in the plea 12 petition or mentioned at the initia l sentencing hearing); State v. Jumping Eagle , 45 (Minn. 2000)

“The tender of a guilty plea, once accepted by a court, is and must be a most solemn commitment.”

n.3 (Minn. 2003) (recognizing that “some plea agreements c ontemplate recommendations by the parties without binding the court to a specific sentence”).

As part of the voluntariness requi rement, “if a guilty pl ea is induced by a government promise, such a promise must be fulfilled or due process is violated.”

If a plea rests “on a promise or agreemen t of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consider ation, such promise must be fulfilled.” (quotations omitted).

Failure to fulfill such a promise or agreement constitutes a due -process violatio n. State v. Wukawitz

State v. Wukawitz , (M inn.

Last ly, we consider whether the Department failed to adhere to the law .7 We consider questions of law under a de novo standard of review, but afford “great weight” to the district court’s findings of fact , State ex rel.

“[T]he intelligent requirement insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” (quotation omitted).

Cf. State v. Wukawitz , , 523 (Minn. 2003) ("The period of supervised release is typically one-third of the original pronounced sentence.").

If a promise within a plea agreement is not fulfilled, “ the voluntariness of the plea is drawn into 5 question.” State v. Wukawitz

This court looks to “what the parties to the plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement in determining whether a plea agreement has been violated.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Wukawitz , , 519 (Minn. 2003) (holding that imposition of a conditional-release period that does not strictly comply with statute is allowed when withdrawal of a plea would unduly prejudice the state, and expressly limiting the holding to situations where impo sition of a conditional-release period would violate the plea agr

8 At oral argument, appellant also argued that State v. Wukawitz , not cited in either party’s brie f, supports his position th at he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas.

(concluding defendant’s plea was invalid where parties agreed that he would receive a 140- month sentence but he was sentenced to an additional five-year conditional release term); Kunshier, d at 379-80 (concluding a district court erred in denying a plea-withdrawal request where defendan

The requirement that a guilty plea be intelligent “insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” State v. Wukawitz , (quotation omitted).

State v. Wukawitz , -22 (Minn. 2003).

The requirement that a guilty plea be intelligent “insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” (quotation omitted).

Murphy notes that the intelligence requirement “insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty.” (quotation omitted).

e. Morris contends that once the court of appeals ruled that a durational departure was unsupported by the evidence, this aspect of the plea agreement “became illusory.” Morris 4 correctly notes that “[w]hen a guilty plea is induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, the voluntariness of the plea is drawn into question.”

When the Legislature changed the felony-sentencing scheme to incorporate a period of “supervised release” into all felony sentences, it changed the term “supervised release” in section 609.109 to “conditional release.” - 23 (Minn. 2003) (explaining the legislative changes in the use of “supervised release” and “conditional release”).