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The mere fact that a 7 mitigating factor is present in a particular case does “not obligate the court to place defendant on probation.”

But “[t]he fact that a mitigating factor was clearly present [does] not obligate [a] court to place defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.”

n which the supreme court reversed an upward durational departure that was almost 50% longer than the top of the presumptive range and directed imposition of a presumptive sentence when the defendant had a severe mental illness and it was “clear from the record that [the] defendant, because of * * * mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed,” (quotation omitted).

(stating that the district court was “not obligate[d]” to depart despite “[t]he fact that a mitigating factor was clearly present”).

d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (an appellate court “will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence falling within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even if there are grounds that would justify departure”) (quotation omitted)); (“the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does not obligate the court to .

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1; see

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1; see

(“The fact that a mitigating factor was clearly present did not obligate the court to place defendant on probation.”).

d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018); 4 (stating that the presence of a mitigating factor does not obligate a district court “to place defendant on probation”); Minn. Sent.

State v. Walker , (citing Kindem, d at 7); see also , (considering that presence of mitigating factor does not obligate district court “to place defendant on probation”); Minn. Sent.

(d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984)).

(citing Kindem, d at 7); see also State v. Wall , (stating that the presence of a mitigating factor does not obligate a district court “to place defendant on probation”); Minn. Sent.

(granting a downward duration al departure where defendant suffered from “the psychosis of paranoid schizophrenia ”); State v. Barsness , (affirming downward durational departure where defendant was suffering from major depression at the time of the offense); , 25 (Minn. 1984) (reversing district court’s imposition of upward durational departure where defendant had a nearly 20 -year documented history of mental illness that included hospitalization and civil commitment); State v. Hennum , (affir

“[T]he mere fact that a mitigating fact or is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the [district] court to place defendant on probation.’” Pegel, d at 253-54 ().

(“The fact that a mitigating factor [is] clearly present [does] not obligate the court to place [a] defe ndant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.”).

Finally, even if a mitigating factor was “clearly present,” it would “not obligate the [district] court to place [the] defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the 8 presumptive term.”

Even if mitigating factors are pres ent, a sentencing court need not grant a downward departure: “departure is not mand atory, and an appellate court will reverse a [district] court’s refusal to depart only in a rare case.” Kahlil, d at 169 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Wall , (presence of mitigating factors does not require a sentencing court to depart).

See, d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) (concluding that upward durational departure was inappropriate where 7 the defendant had a lack of substantial capacity due to schizophrenia) ; review denied (Minn. Aug.

He points to State v. Wall , to argue that, despite a defendant’s voluntary intoxication, courts may consider an underlying mental illness and mitigate a defendant’s culpability and sentence .

“[T]he mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the [district] court to place defendant on probation.’” Pegel, d at 253 -54 (d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) ).

Further, even if the record did support a finding that Valdez is particularly amenable to probation, “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the court to place defend ant on probation or impose a shorter t erm than the presumptive term.’” -54 (Minn. App. 2011) (); -65 (Minn .

But “the presence of mitigating factors does ‘not obligate the court to place [a] defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Wall , ), review denied (Minn. Feb.

Pegel, d at 254; Olson, d at 663; Van Ruler, d at 80-81.

- 54 (Minn. App. 2011) ().

5 Further, even if the record did support a finding that Anderson is particularly amenable to probation, “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not obligate the court to place defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term.’” State v. Pegel , -54 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Wall , ); see also State v. Olson , -65 (Minn. App. 20 09) (“[T]he district court has discretion to impose a downward dispositional departure if a defe

d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011) ().