Cited by

To ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel, the district court “should comprehensively examine the defendant.” (quoting State v. Worthy , ).

that u nnamed witnesses might be willing to testify but provided no information about th eir testimony or assuran ces that they would testify); (concluding that district court properly denied request where state ma y have been prejudiced by loss of witness testimony and defendant had alrea dy received five continuances); State v. Worthy , (concluding that district court properly denied request to substitute counsel on the first day of trial).

“Defendants cannot take advantage of their own willful choice to defeat the ends of justice.” State v. Worthy , -78 (Minn. 1998) (holding that defendants’ strategic and voluntary absence from trial could not form the basis for a claim that they did not validly waive their right to be present at trial).

7 When a defendant raises complaints about the effectiveness of appointed counsel’s representation, the district court should onl y appoint substitute counsel “if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” (citation omitted).

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963); State v. Worthy

See State v. Worthy , -79 (Minn. 1998).

When a defendant refuses to be represente d by a court-appointed public defender, the district court is required to appoint substitute counsel “only if exceptional circumstances exist.” State v. Worthy , (M inn.

In Clark, d at 465, , the court only considered the timeliness of the appellants’ requests with regard to the requests for substitute counsel, not advisory counsel.10 And in State v. Lande, the decision involved an old version of the rule 10 Advisory counsel is “fundame

When a defendant articulates concerns about his court-appointed attorneys’ performance and requests substitute counsel, the district court must grant the request “‘only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.’” ().

See State v. Worthy , -76 (Minn. 1998); State v. Brodie , Finne v. State , review denied (Minn. Oct.

at 884; -76 (Minn. 1998) (considering “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [a] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused” in evaluating a request to waive the right to counsel (quotation om itted)).

The district court should grant a defendant’s request to substitute 7 counsel in “exceptional circumstances” if the defendant made the request “timely and reasonably.”

If an indigent defendant requests the substitution of a court-appointed attorney, a district court must grant the request “‘only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.’” ().

B. Analysis “Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an attorney and a corollary constitutional right to choose to represent themselves in their own trial.” see generally U.S. Const. amend.

9 “Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an attorn ey and a corollary constitutional right to choose to represent themselves in their own trial.” see also U.S. Const. amend.

Unlike cases in which a defendant requests to proceed pro se, or requests substitute 7 counsel, -79 (Minn. 1998), appellant requested neither.

corollary constitutional right to choose to represent themselves in their own trial.”

d 270, 276 (Minn. 1998) (stating that an on-the-record inquiry concerning waiver of counsel was unnecessary where a defendant fired his attorney and had experience with the criminal justice system); see also State v. Krejci , -13 (Minn. 1990) (holding that an on-the-record inquiry concerning waiver of

“Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an attorney and a corollary constitutional right to choose to represent themselves in their own trial.” State v. Worthy, 7 see generally U.S. Const. amend.

(concluding a defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system is a relevant factor in determining voluntary waiver of right to counsel).

“Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an attorney and a corollary constitutional right to choose to represent thems elves in their own trial.” see generally U.S. Const. amend.

“The right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney of choice, but an indigent defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by the attorney of his choice.” State v. Worthy

(indicating that the district court could reasonably presume that defendants were fully advised by their previous attorney on the con sequences of proceeding pro se when they “were provided with competent legal representation for over a month before trial and took full advantage of that represent

“Whether a waiver of a constitutional right is valid depends ‘upon the particular facts 7 and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” -76 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 1023 (1938)).

d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998).

(concluding that the district court could presume counsel informed a defendant of the risks of proceeding pro se w hen the defendant had competent legal representation for over a month).

be expected to conduct their own defense if they chose to fire their attorneys, who were prepared to proceed ; (3) they knew that if they fired their attorneys, the district court would not grant a continuance of the trial for them to hire private counsel; and (4) the district court advised them “that if they chose to proceed pro se, they would be held to the same standard as the attorneys.” d 270, 276 (Minn. 1998).

A defendant’s constitutional “right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney 5 of choice, but an indigent defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by the attorney of his choice.”

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see State v. Worthy

“The right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney of choice, but an indigent defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by the attorney of his choice.” State v. Worthy

at 889 (-76 (Minn. 1998)).

-77 (Minn. 1998) (concluding waiver was still valid even without advisement of charges or potential punishments because co-defendants were represented by counsel for over a month, they knew they were responsible for their own defense, they had prior experience with the criminal justice system, and the distri

This is because we do not allow defendants to “take advantage of their own willful choice to defeat the ends of justice.” State v. Worthy , –78 (Minn. 1998); see also Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S. Ct. at 1061 (“[T]rial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.”).

An indigent defendant is not entitled to an attorney of his choice, but substitute counsel may be granted in “exceptional circumstances.”

Waiver of the right to counsel “The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to an attorney.”

See, d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998) (holding no abuse of discretion by denying a continuance requested a few days before trial by defendant who did not have good cause to dismiss his court- appointed attorney); (affirming denial of continuance requested a few days before trial because

The district court can “reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks of proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.” (quotation omitted).