Cited by

(stating defendant may plead guilty yet maintain innocence on account of lack of memory), but that it was actually an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (stating that defendant may plead guilty based on factual record while maintaining innocence).

871 (Minn. 1961) (ruling that, “under the facts and circumstances,” the district court did not err by accepting petitioner’s guilty plea even though petitioner “had no recollection of what took place on the night in question”).

d 867 (Minn. 1961).1 In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.

the 4 factual basis supporting his plea differs from that of a common guilty plea.

-71 (Minn. 1961) (determining that the district court did not err by accepting a defendant’s guilty plea when he could not remember his state of mind well enough to testify about the factual basis for the intent requirement of the crime).

(recognizing that a defendant may enter a valid plea of guilty despite a failure to recall specifics of the offense).

which allows a defendant to plead guilty even if they do not remember essential elements of the offense as long as the record establishes, and the defendant reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.

(allowing 5 a defendant to plead guilty even though they claim loss of memory regarding the circumstances of the offense).

(allowing a defendant to plead guilty, without admitting guilt, if they claim they cannot remember the offense but acknowledge there is s ufficient evidence to convict them).

) (other citation omitted).

(holding that a defendant may 5 Vossen drove the Grand Am back to Elk River, where he went to an acquaintance’s apartment, but no one was there.