Cited by

See, e.g., Foreman, d at 538-39(affirming a conviction of domestic assault); (involving a conviction for aggravated robbery); (involving a conviction for aggravated robbery).

-51 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no right to defend himself from plain-clothes officers who violently broke into his home to execute a warrant); (ordering a new trial when (1) the complainant testified he was robbed shortly after visiting a friend in a hospital even though it was closed to visitors before the alleged offense occurred and (2) there was no evident reason for the defendant to rob the complainant, “with whom h

and on outdated caselaw that would permit the fact-finder’s credibility determinations to be set aside in rare cases hinging on the incredible, uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, see, 1 but this court has persuasively observed that, “in recent decades, the supreme court consistently has applied a form of review that is more deferential to the fact-finder’s evaluation of the evidence.” WL 2312506, at *

He cites Foreman, in which the supreme court acknowledged that convictions had been reversed in a few cases where the victim was the only witness and the case “involved additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” d at 539 ( -93 (Minn. 1993); State v. Gluff , ).

he two girls’ stories were not 1 See Huss, d at 290-92 (reversing conviction for sexual abuse of a three-year- old child because the only direct evidence came from the child and the child had been repeatedly exposed to “a highly suggestive book on sexual abuse” with “the express intention of encouraging the child to state that [the defendant] had abused her”); (reversing in the interests of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [the victim], with whom he was well ac

to support his argument that corroboration is necessary for his conviction to be upheld.

Only in certain exceptional circumstances has a reviewing court, after a conviction, determine d that a witness was not credible and that their testimony alone was insufficient, such as when the witness’s presen ce in the area where the offense occurred was questionable and unexplained, State v. Langteau , or when an expert testified that the sole child witness, who struggled to identify the defendant and recall his alleged acts, had been exposed to highly suggestive material that could have cau

(reversing an aggravated robbery conviction because parts of the complaining witness’s version of events were “unexplained,” and “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [ the complaining witness], with whom he was well acquainted, [was] left a mystery” ); State v. Gluff , -

(involving aggravated robbery); (same).

-93 (Minn. 1993) (holding that testimony of alleged victim of child abuse was insufficient because there was expert testimony that the child had been exposed to highly suggestive material); (reversing conviction that was based solely on uncorroborated testimony of victim); (affirming conviction but recognizing that in some cases, lack of corroboration may lead to conclusion that evidence of guilt is insufficient).

ause the actions by the victim and the defendant were questionable or unexplained, there was no other evidence linking the defendant to the crime, and the jury originally reported no possibility of reaching an agreement before returning a guilty 12 verdict almost ten hours after the commencement of deliberations and the receipt of additional instructions on the meaning of “reasonable doubt.”

ss’s credibility exist and the state presented no corroborating evidence, Minnesota’s appellate courts will reverse convictions.” In support of this assertion, Holloway cites three supreme court cases in which the court reversed convictions because the evidence was insufficient: 6

Third, Vang argues that reversal is warranted based on “insufficient credible testimony from the accusing witnesses,”

-93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing for insufficient evidence when the only evidence was provided by a very young child with contradictory testimony on central issues); (reversing for insufficient evidence when the jury reached a speedy determination that, “[u]nder the circumstances, .

Maani relies on three cases— —to argue that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because of issues regarding the victims’ credibility.

the interests of justice [require] a new trial.”

6 for assault in the second degree, despite victim ’s temporary pretrial recantation of her accusations); -93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing conviction for child sexual abuse based on the victim’s repeated exposure to a highly suggestive book by the child’s therapist and mother); (reversing in the interest s of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [the victim], with whom he was well acquainted, is left a mystery.” ); (reversing because armed robbery victim observed defend

Second, a case of aggravated robbery in which the supreme court reversed a guilty verdict because the state’s evidence did not explain defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime or his motive.

and State v. Gluff, 172 N.W .2d 63 (Minn. 1969), in support of his argument.

and State v. Gluff , as providing support for his argument.

g. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Foreman, the distinction between cases like Reichenberger, where credibility is left to the jury, and cases where evidence may be insufficient as a matter of law, is when there are “additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” Foreman, d at 539 (- 93 (Minn. 1993)); ).

In support, Phillips cites two supreme court opinions

the supreme court reversed a conviction for assault based on the victim’s u ncorroborated testimony because the victim’s testimony was questionable and unexplained.

(hol ding that, although it was possi ble to justify the jury’s verdict, “a careful consideration of the record” warranted a ne w trial “in the interests of justice”); see, (determining that the testimony of the alleged victim o f child abuse wa

In State v. Langteau , , the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, whose actions were “questionable or unexplained .” Id.

In State v. Langteau, “nothing was discovered to link [the defendant] with the crime” and the prosecutor had urged the jury to overlook that gap by suggesting that the defendant may have been “under the influence of drugs” even though the prosecutor could cite “no support whatever in the record.”

-93 (Minn. 1993); d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978).

In State v. Langteau , only the alleged victim and the defendant gave significant evidence at tri al.

-93 (Minn. 1993); State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151

Heidemann relies on three cases, and State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, d 63 (1969).

But, as Gocha argues, “convictions have been reversed where the evidence supporting the conviction was of dubious credibility.” For that proposition, he cites two cases from the Minnesota Supreme Court: –93 (Minn. 1993)

In the second case, State v. Langteau, only the defendant and the alleged victim “gave significant evidence at the trial.”

-93 (Minn. 1993) (noting “unusual facts” and reversing conviction for criminal sexual 5 conduct where child victim’s testimony lacked credibility and victim had been exposed by the state to highly suggestive material); (ordering a new trial “in the interests of justice” where victim’s actions were left “unexplained” and motive for defendant to commit robbery against an acquaintance was “left a mystery”); State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 151-53, -66 (1969) (reversing aggravated-robbery convict

In the second case, State v. Langteau, only the defendant and the alleged victim “gave significant evidence at the trial.”