Cited by

8, 2018) (noting “no Minnesota appellate caselaw has applied transferred intent to an assault-fear conviction”).6 “The decision to give a requested jury instruction lies in the discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

not established that “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different” without the delayed disclosure, Boldman, d at 109, the district court was within its discretion in determining that a continuance was an appropriate remedy to address any prejudice that Smetana would experience as a result of the discovery violation, 7 (“Generally, without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violation of a discovery rule will not result in a new trial.”

“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which this court reviews de novo.”

If a defendant cannot establish this foundation, “the alternative perpetrator evidence is not admissible [,] and the trial court need not consider any of the alternative perpetrator evidence further.”

The word “any” in this context means “every.”

“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which this court reviews de novo.”

“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which this court reviews de novo.”

The supreme court has concluded that Rule 9.01 “requires the State to disclose the substance of every oral statement by a witness that relates to the case, even if the witness does not disclose new or different information from previously disclosed statements.” (d 476, 490 (Minn. 2005) ).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which [an appellate] court reviews de novo.”

But “[w]hether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which [an appellate] court reviews de novo.”

A new trial will only be granted based on objected-to prosecutorial misconduct if the misconduct, “viewed in the light of the whole record, appears to be inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was denied.” (quotation omitted).

But “[w]hether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which this court reviews de novo.”

See, -91 (Minn. 2009) (considering time and place of murder for foundation of alternative-perpetrator evidence); (determining no inherent tendency connected third party to charged crime because proposed evidence did not show third party was at or near the crime scene when it occurred).

“Generally, without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violation of a discovery rule will not result in a new trial.”

-91 (Minn. 20 05) (indicating that a defendant must demonstrate that an alleged discovery violation resulted in prejudice to prevail on appeal).

(citing State v. Bailey, 8 ).

d 476, 485 (Minn. 2005) (“If the defendant fails to lay a proper foundation, the alternative- perpetrator evidence is not admissible and the trial court need not consider any of the alternative perpetrator evidence further.”).

y was not corroborated, and, under Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2018), “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accom plice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense.” But an accomplice is a person who “could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the accused is charged.”

“Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law which [we] review[] de novo.”

The district court considered the two distinct marital -privileges: “(1) the privilege to prevent a spouse from testifying against the other during the marriage; and (2) the privilege to prevent a spouse from t estifying at any time concerning confidential interspousal communications made during the marriage.”

Declining to give “a requested j ury instruction lies in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” d 476, 487 (Minn. 2005).