Cited by

Such a warrantless seizure must be supported by “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (citations omitted).

“The reasonable suspicion standard can also be met based on information provided by a reliable informant.”

The standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

(explaining that the “reasonable suspicion standard is not high” and that the “standard is less demanding than probable cause” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The reasonable suspicion standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted) .

Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))).

“[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” (quotation omitted) .

“Police must be able to articulate more than an inchoate 6 and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity[;] [t]hey must articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

And in State v. Timberlake, “we reaffirm[ed] our interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714 set forth in Paige.” d 390, 397 (Minn. 2008).

The reasonable suspicion standard is “not high.” (quotations omitted).

A limited exception to the warrant requirement permits law enforcement to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Lugo, d at 486 ().

However, an exception to the rule prohibiting warrantless searches and seizures allows a police officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a n officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); Taylor, d at 758

An exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

(citing Davis, d at 183).

The reasonable-suspicion standard required for a traffic stop is “not high” and “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of evidence.” (quotations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause but “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is satisfied when an officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968))).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is satisfied if “an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

10 The reasonable-suspicion standard is met when an officer observes conduct that leads the officer to “reasonably conclude in li ght of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

The standard for reasonable susp icion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticul arized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake , (quotations omitted); (an officer “may draw infere nces and deductions that might elude an untrained person”).

The reasona ble-suspicion standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake , ).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

7 Under this exception, a police officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).

The standard for reasonable suspicion is “not high,” but it requires more than “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (quotations omitted).

6 activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitted).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The reasonable -suspicion standard is met when an officer observes conduct that leads the officer to “reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable suspicion showing is “not high,” but requires more than an unarticulated “hunch,” d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Timberlake, (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that c riminal activity may be afoot.” (quotation omitted).

A law enforcement officer may, however, “consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop” of a motor vehi cle when “the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).

Nevertheless, it requires more than an unarticulated “hunch.”

“To determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been violated , we examine the specific police conduct at issue.”

The standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , (quotation omitte d).

The standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, 4 and will be met with “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably” justify the officer’s conduct, (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

Unde r both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions, officers may “conduct a brief, i nvestigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (quotation omitted).

The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is met when the officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” (d at 691).

2 The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Timberlake , held that law enforcement can initiate a Terry stop based solely on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual is carrying a gun.