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“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

But “[d]etermining the legal standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

See Dahl v. Dahl , (reviewing parenting-time determination for abuse of discretion).

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

“A district court abuses its discretion if its findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law.”

“A district court’s findings of fact underlying a parenting- time decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Minn. App. 1 The order also denied mother’s motion for contempt, denied father’s motion for attorney fees, and granted in part mother’s motion for attorney fees.

Generally, a district court has “broad discretion” to address “parenting-time,” and an appellate court will not reverse its decision on the point “absent an abuse of that discretion.” (making this statement in a marital-dissolution appeal).

But “[d]etermining the legal standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”

“Determining the legal standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”

2 “District courts have broad discretion on matters of custody and parenting time.” d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009) ( ) (“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

A reduction in parenting time “is not necessarily a restriction of parenting time”; rather, a restriction may exist if “a change to parenting time is ‘substantial.’” - 24 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation 8 omitted).

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

Given its broad discretion over parenting-time issues, d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009) , the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that FamilyWise supervision and compensatory parenting time were sufficient and that “[l]aw enforcement intervention is unnecessary at this time.” V Father’s next two arguments relate to the district court’s September 2022 orde

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting -time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

While a reduction in parenting time “is not necessarily a restriction of parenting time,” a restriction may occur “when a change to parenting time is ‘substantial.’” -24 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted); see, -86 (Minn. App. 1984) (determining multiple reductions in parenting time that reduced parenting time from 14 to 5 1/2 weeks per year was a restriction), rev. denied (Minn. June 12, 1984).

“To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction.”

“To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the changes as well as the amount of the reduction.” (quotation omitted).

“To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction.”

“To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction.”

Alleged clear errors Factual findings “underlying a parenting-time decision will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Minn. R. Civ.

First, the current parenting-time schedule from the dissolution judgment is the “baseline” for any future motion to modify parenting time because that schedule is within “the last permanent and final order setting parenting time.”

“Determ ining the legal standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”

d 118 (Minn. App. 2009), to support her contention.

“The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”

“Determining the legal standard applicable to a change in parenting time is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”

See Hagen v. Schirmers , 783 NW.2d 212, 217 (Minn. App. 2010) (noting that it is “important” that the 25% parenting -time presumption was brought to the attention of the district court in that case becau se appellate courts do not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court) (citing Thiele, d at 582); (directing district courts to demonstrate an awareness and application of the presumption when the issue is appropriately raised and the court awards less than 25% parenting

In addressing this prong, we must first identify the “baseline parenting-time schedule”—“the last permanent and final orde r setting parenting time” — and then we must determine whether the changes from that baseline schedule are “significant enough to constitute a restriction.”

Although we review the decision to grant or deny parenting time modification motions for an abuse of discretion, determining what legal standard applies to a request to change parenting time is a question of law that we review de novo, ).

2008) (holding that modifying custody requires proof that “the child[ren]’s present environment endangers the child[ren]’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child[ren]’s emotional development” and balancing “the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment” against “the advantage of a change to the child[ren]” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2006)); (holding that restricting parenting time requires proof that “parenting time is likely to endanger the child’s physical 8 or

5 (2008), a district court “may not restrict parenting time unless it finds that: (1) parenting time is likely to endanger the child ’s physical or emotional health or impair the child ’s emotional development; or (2) the parent has chronically and unreasonably failed to comply with court-ordered parenting time.” Dahl v. Dahl , see also Minn. Stat. § 5 18.175, subd.

“Appellate review of custody modifica tion and removal cases is limited to considering whether the [dis trict] court abused its di scretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 6 84 (Minn. 2008) (q uotations omitted); see also Dahl v. Dahl , (“The district c ourt has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issu es and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”).