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Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we assume the district court believed the testimony that the barn lacked adequate ventilation and “disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

First, we consider the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” 383 (Minn. 2011).

An appellate court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” d 105, 110 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted), and assumes that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” (quotation omitted).

“We must assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

This court assumes that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

This court must also “assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” and defer to the credibility decisions of the fact-finder.

n.6 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that the truncated recitation of the test in Warren “does not remove ‘not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful’ from what must be proved”).

n State v. Caldwell, the court held that excluding the defendant’s mother from trial after she repeatedly disrupted proceedings and closing the courtroom for jury instructions did not violate the defendant’s public-trial right because the district court excluded only a specific individual “and never excluded all 7 spectators from the courtroom even when the court locked the courtroom doors.”

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

5 DECISION An appellate court “must assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

n.7 (Minn. 2023) (explaining that “[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius means ‘the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another’ and reflects the inference 7 that statutory omissions are intentional” ()); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.19 (2020) (“Provisos shall be construed to limit rather than to extend the operation of the clauses to which they refer.

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State 5 v. Caldwell, (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

However, allegations in a postconviction petition must be “more than argumentative assertions without factual support.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the [district court] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell , (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

This court assumes that “the jury believed [one party or the other] and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell , (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “review criminal bench trials the same as jury tr ials when determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions ,” State v. Holliday , (quotation omitted), and assume that “the [district court] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary ,” State v. Caldwell , (quotation omitted) .

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

In doing so, “[w]e must assume [that] the jury believed the state’s witnesses and 10 disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This canon generally raises a presumption that “any omissions in a statute are intentional.”

–81, 390 (Minn. 2011) (intent to murder a targeted victim transferred to the murder of the wrong target); Cruz-Ramirez, d at 501–02, 507 (intent to murder one victim transferred to the murder of a bystander who was shot and killed); 229 (Minn. 1995) (intent to murde

We must assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

When a jury is the fact-finder, we assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

When a jury is the fact-finder, we assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617- 18 (1983) (holding that two meetings between defendant and counsel were insufficient grounds for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim); d 373, 387 (Minn. 2011) (stating that “the number of attorney-client consultations does not alone demonstrate inadequate representation”).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).

“We must assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Caldwell , (quotation omitted).

We assume that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (quotation omitted).