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“The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” (quotation omitted).

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)

“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [appellate courts] are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” –47 (Mi nn.

-43 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

Because the exclusionary rule require s the district court to suppress the results of a PBT administered without reasonable suspicion, d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011), we must consider whether the district court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to ask Lorsung to perform the PBT.

“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [appellate courts] are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” –47 (Minn. 2011).

State v. Diede , -43 (Minn. 2011).

r the arguments, and the alternative grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.” n.2 (Minn. 2013) (citing Grunig and determining that the state’s argument that the defendant consented to the search was properly before the court despite not being raised or addressed in district court); n.6 (Minn. 2011) (citing Grunig and explaining “a respondent may raise new arguments on appeal”).

“The reasonable- suspicion standard is not high.” (quotation omitted) .

will countenance introduction of otherwise illegally-seized evidence if the police could have retrieved it on the basis of information obtained independent of their illegal activity.” (quotation omitted).

22 (declining to apply the inevitable-discovery exception and remanding for factual findings because the district court did not consider “several factual issues crucial to inevitable discovery”); (determining that the “facts of [the] case do not show that the police would inevitably have discovered” the illegally obtained evidence based on “probable cause to arrest” the defendant); (describing the inevitable-discovery exception as “na

“The independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)

Although evidence obtained from an unconstitutional stop or seizure must be suppressed, a police officer may constitutionally conduct a limited traffic stop without a warrant if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

“Mere proximity to, or association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion of [criminal activity].”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968)

Although appellate courts frequently consider the actually articulated rationale that the seizing officer relied on for the stop, see, the more accurately described objective test is “whether a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists from the perspective of a trained police officer.” (emphasis added).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] person of criminal activity.” - discovered by exploiting previous illegal conduct” is inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.