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“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] person of criminal activity.” - discovered by exploiting previous illegal conduct” is inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)

Police may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspects that person of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

“Evidence obtained as a result of a seizure without reasonable suspicion must be suppressed.”

The correct standard is “reasonable articulable suspicion.”

” State v. Diede , -47 (Minn. 2011).

I. Decision Denying Mason’s Motion to Suppress We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings underlying a decision whether to suppress evidence, State v. Gauster , and we review de novo whether a n investigative detention or pat-down search is justified by reasonable suspicion, .

Given our consistent recognition that warrantless searches are “presumptively unreasonable,” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), the devaluing of the warrant requirement by Ross may justify us interpreting the Minnesota Constitution more broadly in this specific context.

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)); see also State 5 v. Diede, .

(concluding individual’s refusal of consent to search cigarette packet in her sweatshirt pocket could not be considered in establishing probable cause for a search); n.3 (Minn. 2004) (stating “passive refusal to consent to a search cannot be treated as evidence of

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific , articulable facts,” and the police officer must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” -43 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011)

When the facts are undisputed, “ we review de novo the issue of whether the stipulated facts support a determination that the police articulated a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warranting the governmental intrusions in question.”

d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is “not high.”

d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011).

“For a search to fall under the consent exception, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was given freely and voluntarily.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011).

State v. Diede , 2 (Minn. 2011).

Under Terry, an officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspects that person of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

Th e district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous if an appellate court, after reviewing the record evidence, is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede , -47 (Minn. 2011).

For reasonable suspicion to exist, there must be “specific, articulable facts” that allow the officer to show that he “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” - 43 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitte d).

Under the principles of Terry, an officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the officer reasonably suspec ts that person of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

Under the first Terry prong, “we ask whether the traffic stop was justified at its inception,” id., by a showing of “reasonable articulable suspicion,” State v. Diede

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19- 22, (1968); -43 (Minn. 2011).

See State v. Rohde , (search); (seizure).

d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011).