Cited by

(stating that it is “rare” to prove intent through direct evidence and it may be inferred through circumstantial evidence).

The state must additionally prove that Garth (1) “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime” and (2) “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).

owing role 7 in the crime, the jury can infer the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, such as “the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.”

Moreover, in determining whether the evidence proves that a defendant intentionally aided another in the commission of a crime, a fact- finder may consider, among other things, “the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, [and] a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances.” State v. McAllister

(“It is rare for the State to establish a defendant ’s state of mind through direct evidence.”).

“The ‘intentionally aids’ element of accomplice liability is a state-of-mind requirement, ” (quotation omitted), that is rarely proven with direct evidence

-53 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that the defendant was liable under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

(“It is rare for the [s]tate to establish a defendant’s state of mind through direct evidence.”).

(“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”).

Second, the court must “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Second, the court must “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. McAllister , (quotation omitted).

Jones cites State v. McAllister , and argues that because the “intentionally aids” element of a ccomplice liability is a st ate of mind, it is “generally proven through circumstantial ev idence .

The phrase “intentionally aids” includes two elements: “(1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (citation omitted ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g., State v. McAllister , (stating that the “reasonably 3 While unnecessary to our plain language analysis, we observe that the legislative history of section 604.18 is robust and clea rly confirms our unders tanding of legislative intent.

14, 2010 ); see also State v. McAllister , (noting rarity of being able to establish defendant’s state of mind through direct evidence).

See State v. McAllister , , 62 (Minn. 2015) (holding that any error in the case "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the verdict was surely unattributable to the error").

The “intentionally aids” requirement includes two “important and necessary prin ciples: (1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotations omitted).

State v. McAllister , , 59 (Minn. 2015) ; see also State v. Hannon , , 807 (Minn. 2001).

“Intentionally aids” means the defendant knew his accomplice was “going to commit a crime,” and “intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. McAllister , (quotation omitted).

the [s]tate bears the burden to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“Intentionally aids” means that the defendant knew her alleged accomplice was “going to commit a crime,” and intended her “presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotation omitted).

Consequently, any error in admitting the examiner’s reference to the report “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the verdict was surely unattributable to the error.” (“Improperly admitted evidence is harmless .

(noting that “[i]t is rare for the State to establish a *644 defendant’s state of mind through direct evidence”).

The phrase “intentionally aids” in subdivision 1 of the accomplice-liability statute “includes two important and necessary principles: (1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” (quotations omitted).