Cited by

any physical indicia of impairment; (2) Lorsung exhibited no signs of impairment on the initial HGN test; (3) the officers’ statements at the scene show that they did not believe Lorsung was impaired; (4) there was an approximately 11-minute gap between Officer S leaving Lorsung to attend to the rest of the scene and returning to request the PBT; and (5) the 6 (explaining that, in addition to a driver making a wide right turn and “drifting,” relevant circumstances justifying a traffic stop inclu

“The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” ().

“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” ( Nonprecedential opinions in this opinion are cited for their persuasive value.

“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” ( 9 (Minn. 1988)).

that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

This standard is “not high, ” and officers are “entitled to draw inferences on the basis of all of the circumstances.” (quotations omitted).

“The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” (quotations omitted).

“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” ().

Therefore, (stating appellate courts “must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it.” () (other quotation omitted)).

We generally only consider issues that “were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” ().

“The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or she had 5 a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

(wide turn and drifting within lane plus 11 provide reasonable suspicion if it is of the type that is commonly associated with impairment.

While we recognize that the reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, it does require more than an officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch[.]’ ” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted) .

The deputy testified that based on his training and experience, licenses are often canceled as inimical to public safety because a driver has multiple DWI convictions.5 –03 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that when determining 5 The dissent claims any infe rence that Taylor had a record of repeat DWI convictions is “supposition proffered by the State after the fact” because the deputy did not testify that he inferred Taylor had such a record.

“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (c itation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

along the corridor of [Interstate] 94, which is [known for] drug smuggling efforts of specifically marijuana coming from the west coast.” “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” (quotations omitted).

that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted) .

that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” 2 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted).

“The reasonable suspicion standard is not high.” (citation and quotation omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or s he had a particularized and objective basis for 7 suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

2 In assigning error, he cites Thiele v. Stich , and State v. Morse

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the 7 officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal act ivity.” State v. Morse , (quotations omitted).

State v. Morse , , 502 (Minn. 2016) (citing Thiele v. Stich , , 582 (Minn. 1988) ).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” (quotations omitted).

-03 (Minn. 2016) (upholding a traffic stop based on an officer’s observation of a wide right turn and drifting in a traffic lane, around bar closing time, in a downtown area with bars).

See State v. Morse , - 02 (Minn. 2016) (citing Thiele v. Stich , ).

Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that a llow the officer to be able to articulate a “particularized and objective basis for suspecti ng the seized person of criminal activity.” (q uotation omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on spec ific, articulable facts that allow the officer to be able to articulate that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized pers on of criminal activity.” (quotations omitte d).

“In reviewing a district court’s determinations of the legality of a limited inves tigatory stop, we re view questions of 4 reasonable suspicion de novo.” State v. Morse , (quotation omitted).

“In reviewing a district court’s determ inations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.” (quotation omitted).

d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016).

Appellate courts consider the totality of the circumstances, recognizing that the “special training of police officers may lead them to arrive at inferences and deductions that might we ll elude an untrained person.” Askerooth, d at 369 (quotations omitted); (stating that an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a stop is based on the totality of the circumstances).

28, 2011); (stating that court of appeals erred when it addressed c onstitutionality issue not argued on appeal); (stating that party may not raise issues at oral argument that were not previously raised).