Cited by

4 To be sure, even when “each individual factor is consistent with innocent travel, all of the factors together may amount to reasonable suspicion.”

d at 580-81; (noting that , while each factor was consistent with innocent behavior, factors taken together justified reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); (determining that an officer’s observation of apparently innocent acts can be significant to

However, “all of the factors together may amount to reasonable suspicion” even if “each individual factor is consistent with innocent travel.”

d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998) (stating that in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts weigh the totality of the circumstances).

d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998).

However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that “innocent factors in their totality, combined with the investigating officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)).

(requiring consideration of the totality of the circumstances).

to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience ” (emphasis added)); (stating that training and experience are relevant because “police officers may interpret circumstances differen tly than untrained persons”); State v. Martinson , (Page, J., dissenting) (“[T]he state must articulate what it is about the officer’s training and experience , coupled with the fa cts relied on, that creates a reasonable suspicion of illegal c o

In the right circumstances even “wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity [is] afoot.” (quotation omitted).

d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998).

State v. Martinson , , 849 (Minn. 1998).

But the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that in some circ umstances, even where “each indivi dual factor is consistent with innocent travel, all of the factors together may amount to reasonable suspicion.” State v. Martinson

This court analyzes whether reasonable suspicion exists “from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.”

d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998).

But even “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal activity.”

State v. Johnson , -27 (Minn. 1989); see also State v. Martinson , (stating that innocent factors “in their totality, combined with the investigatin g officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion”).

can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” State v. Martinson , accord United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 9–10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989) (“ Terry itself involved ‘a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent’ if viewed separately, ‘but which taken together warranted further investigation.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880−81))

See State v. Martinson , (“The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search .

Also, “‘innocent’ factors in their totality, combined with the investigating officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980)).

“[I]nnocent factors in their totality, combined with the investigating officer’s experience in apprehending drug traffickers, can be sufficient bases for finding reasonable suspicion.” (quotation omitted); 354 (Minn. 2012) (stating that driver’s “violent shaking” that appeared to be caused by nervousness and “evasive explanation that he suffer[ed] from a lifelong undiagnosed medical condition” were sufficient to give rise to a reaso

d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998) (stating a brief investigatory stop is permissible if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).

(stating that in 8 support the district court’s conclusion that Sgt.