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n who has such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual 4 (directing the district court to consider these factors: “(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age, educ

ite not completing sex-offender treatment, he has made “progress.” The district court considers several factors when analyzing whether a person is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct, including “the base rate statistics 6 for violent behavior among individuals of this person’s background” and “the person’s record with respect to sex therapy programs.”

In re Linehan (Linehan I)

In re Linehan (Linehan I)

-14 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted); (describing dangerousness factor as “substantial likelihood” of inflicting “serious physical or mental harm”).

Ince, d at 22 (); see also Spicer, d at 807 (stating that the foregoing are “commonly known as the Linehan factors”).

(Linehan I); (Linehan III) (applying these factors to SDP case).

Once the district court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports commitment as an SDP or an SPP, the district court “shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility unless the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less 4 (setting forth six factors courts should consider in predicting whether a person who has been found to lack power to control their sexual impulses is a danger to the public).

The assessment of whether an individual is highly likely to reoffend involves a multi-factor analysis that may include both the results from various assessment tools and the factors set forth by the supreme court in (Linehan I).

Camacho contends that the district court analyzed only the six factors set forth by the supreme court in (Linehan I), and failed to engage in the multi-factor analysis approved by the supreme court in its later decision in Ince, d at 22-25.

The determination was supported by the various actuarial risk assessments performed by the examiners, other evaluations and Munn’s criminal histor y, and an analysis of the six factors for determining a person’s likelihood of reoffending, as set forth in , which all weighed in favor of finding that Munn is highly likely to reoffend.

It is not sufficient in such a proceeding for a district court to make determinations on factors “in a conclusory fashion.”

24, 201 1), and a de novo standard ofreview to the question whether the facts found by the district court satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment, (Linehan I).

(civil commitment as a psychopathic personality); (attorney misconduct); d 656, 663 (Minn. App. 2012) (termination of parental rights).

In re Linehan (Linehan I), .

In re Linehan , (applying Pearson construction of the SPP statute); In re Blodgett , (holding that the SPP statute is constitutional and reaffirming Pearson construction of statute), cert.

See In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , ().

Ince, d at 22 ( (Linehan I)).

Dr. Meyers provided a thorough Blodgett-factor analysis, based on In re Blodgett , and a Linehan-factor analysis, based on Matter of Linehan , .

“We apply a de novo standard of review to the question whether the facts found by the district court satisfy the statutory criteria for commitment, which is a question of law.” Spicer, d at 807 ( (Linehan I )).

Stone, d at 840 ( (Linehan I)).

The district court also considered the six factors listed in (Linehan I), and the five factors from -77 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV), and determined that the factors supported commitment.