Cited by

d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that appellate courts “defer to the fact-finder on determinations of credibility”), -93 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that, on the “unusual” facts of the case, the state failed to meet its burden of proof when the only direct evidence of abuse was the child- victim’s testimony, the testimony was “contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all, and was inconsistent with her prior statements

Everson also points to State v. Huss, where the supreme court reversed a criminal- sexual-conduct conviction based on the case’ s “unusual facts.”

relies on, among other cases, 2 The district court convicted Huss of second-degree criminal sexual conduct against his three-year-old daughter.

“We will not overturn the verdict if the jury, acting with regard for the presumption C-3 of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could [have] reasonably conclude[d] that the defendant was guilty.” Jones, d at 502; (stating that our sufficiency of the evidence inquiry where the State offered direct evidence of the crime “is limited to whether, given the evidence as it was presented in court, a jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant was guilty beyond a

He cites Foreman, in which the supreme court acknowledged that convictions had been reversed in a few cases where the victim was the only witness and the case “involved additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” d at 539 ( -93 (Minn. 1993); State v. Gluff , ).

-92 (Minn. 1993) (“At trial, the state’s only direct evidence that the child was abused came from the child herself.”); see also State v. Coley , (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted 8 direct evidence of his crimes.”).

-92 (Minn. 1993) (“At trial, the state’s only direct evidence that the child was abused came from the child herself.”); State v. Coley , (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted direct evidence of his 7 crimes.”).

“When reviewing a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate] court’s inquiry is limited to whether, given the evidence as it was presented in court, a jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(stating that the “only direct evidence presented by the state was the testimony of the alleged victim” of criminal sexual conduct); (“The victim’s uncontradicted testimony constituted direct evidence of [the defendant’s] crimes.”).

nt, such as when the witness’s presen ce in the area where the offense occurred was questionable and unexplained, State v. Langteau , or when an expert testified that the sole child witness, who struggled to identify the defendant and recall his alleged acts, had been exposed to highly suggestive material that could have caused false statements, State v. Huss , d 290, 292-93 (Minn. 1993).

to argue that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there are multiple reasons to doubt M.J’s credibility.

11 Carranza cites State v. Huss, a criminal-sexual-conduct case with “unusual facts .”

-93 (Minn. 1993) (holding that testimony of alleged victim of child abuse was insufficient because there was expert testimony that the child had been exposed to highly suggestive material); (reversing conviction that was based solely on uncorroborated testimony

See Balsley, d at 887; (explaining that, “even given [the alleged victim’s] contradictory testimony, we might not be persuaded to reverse absent the repeated use of a highly suggestive book on sexual abuse”).

s where additional reasons to question the witness’s credibility exist and the state presented no corroborating evidence, Minnesota’s appellate courts will reverse convictions.” In support of this assertion, Holloway cites three supreme court cases in which the court reversed convictions because the evidence was insufficient: 6

In State v. Huss, the supreme court reversed a conviction based on “unusual facts.” -93 (Minn. 1993).

-93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing for insufficient evidence when the only evidence was provided by a very young child with contradictory testimony on central issues); (reversing for insufficient evidence when the jury reached a speedy determination that, “[u]nder the

Maani relies on three cases— —to argue that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because of issues regarding the victims’ credibility.

6 for assault in the second degree, despite victim ’s temporary pretrial recantation of her accusations); -93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing conviction for child sexual abuse based on the victim’s repeated exposure to a highly suggestive book by the child’s therapist and mother); (reversing in the interest s of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have

Fourth, a case of criminal sexual conduct in which the supreme court reversed a guilty verdict because it was based solely on the testimony of a three-year-old child, which was “contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all, and was inconsistent with her prior statements and other verifiable facts.”

supports reversing his conviction.

see also State v. Huss , -93 (Minn. 1993).3 3 Appellant cites to a nonprecedential decision of this court for the proposition that a prosecutor may not tell a jury that its burden of proof is necessarily satisfied by one witness’s credibility.

and State v. Gluff , as providing support for his argument.

As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Foreman, the distinction between cases like Reichenberger, where credibility is left to the jury, and cases where evidence may be insufficient as a matter of law, is when there are “additional reasons to question the victim’s credibility.” Foreman, d at 539 (- 93 (Minn. 1993)); ).

Thompson recognizes those principles , but he attempts to circumvent them by relying on State v. Huss

–93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing criminal-sexual-conduct conviction when the only direct evidence was a young child’s “particularly troublesome” testimony and the child was exposed to a “highly suggestive” book and tape about sexual abuse that may have caused her to imagine the abuse); see also 4 State v. Ani, 2

-94 (Minn. 1993) (reversing criminal-sexual-conduct conviction where child victim’s “testimony was contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all, and was inconsistent with her prior statements and other verifiable facts”) to argue that A.A.’s testimony was “insufficient evidence.” But “a conviction ca

For example, in State v. Huss , -93 (Minn. 1993), the supreme court reversed a conviction of crimin al sexual conduct supported by a young child victim’s testimony of sexual abuse b y her father where there was expert testimony that the young victim had been exposed by her mother to highly suggestive material.

(hol ding that, although it was possi ble to justify the jury’s verdict, “a careful consideration of the record” warranted a ne w trial “in the interests of justice”); see, (determining that the testimony of the alleged victim o f child abuse was insufficient because there was expert testimony that the victim had been exposed to highly suggestive material and her testimony was not sufficiently credible).

d 290 (Minn. 1993), the appellant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct.

a case in which the supreme court found tha t there was insufficient evide nce to support the defendant’s conviction for crimin a l s e x u a l c o n d u c t w h e r e t h e o nly direct evidence presented by the state was the testimony of a three-year-old child.7 But in Huss, the only direct e