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But the Minnesota Supreme Court has clarified that, when “calendar congestion is the reason for delay, it weighs less heavily against the state than would deliberate attempts to delay trial.”

Scurlock claims that the delay caused anxiety and concern, claiming he “was left to wonder when or if his trial would ever happen.” But he has not shown how this “stress, anxiety and inconvenience [is any different from that] experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial.” (accepting that 8 all criminal defendants experience stress and anxiety while awaiting trial); see also Osorio, d at 631 (noting that the prejudice suffered must be due to the delay).

16 C. Assertion of Right A defendant need not continuously reassert a speedy -trial demand, but this court will consider “the frequency and force of a demand” because “the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted .” (citing Barker, 407 U. S. at 529 , 531).

“[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor [because] the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.”

(noting that docket congestion is not a good cause for delay, but it also does not weigh heavily against the state).

“[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor [because] the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.”

“[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor and the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989).

(“[D]elays greater than 60 days after a demand for speedy trial has been made are presumptively prejudicial and require further inquiry to determine whether there was good cause for the delay.”); see also Mikell, d at 244 (“[t]here is no fixed rule for all cases that defines how long is

“[D]el ays beyond the 60-day limit simp ly raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”

The supreme court has interpreted this rule “to mean that delays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” d 509, 513 (Minn. 1989).

Such demands are “likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” State v. Friberg

If this delay were attributed to the state, it could best be described as a delay of the “calendar congestion” type, and “[w]here calendar congestion is the reason for delay, it weighs less heavily agains t the state than would deliberate attempts to delay trial.”

The supreme court has interpreted the rule “to mean that delays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a 14 further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”

The supreme court has interpreted this rule “to mean that delays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has occurred and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”

See State v. Friberg , (stating that while there is no arbitrary time limit for speedy trials, “delays greater than 60 days af ter a demand for speedy trial has been made are presumptively prejudicial”).

“[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor and the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.”

“Where calendar congestion is the reason fo r delay, it weighs less heavily against the state than would deliberate attempts to delay trial.”

“[C]onditions of probation must be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing and must not be unduly restrictive.” Moody, d at 877 (quoting State v. Friberg , ).

“[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this factor and the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.”

This court will carefully review the district court’s discretion in imposing probation conditions “when [those] conditions restrict fundamental rights.” State v. Friberg

Deliberate attempts to delay trial weigh heavily against the state, Osorio, d at 628 (quotation omitted), whereas more neutral reasons like court calendar congestion weigh less heavily

(“[T]he delay was caused by calendar congestio n .

ssence, plea agreements represent “a bargaine d-for understanding between the government and 2 The district court has broad di scretion to determine condition s of probation, so long as the conditions are “reasonably related to the purposes of sente ncing” and not “unduly restrictive of the probatione r’s liberty or autonomy.”

State v. Friberg , , 515 (Minn. 1989).

“Where calendar congestion is the reason for delay, it weighs less heavily against the state than would deliberate attempts to delay trial.” (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192).

See, (stating that “[t]he only prejudice atte sted to .

-16 (Minn. 1989).2 A reasonable probationer would 2 Poillon cites an unpublished decision of this court to support her argument that a condition containing the term “stay out of” is vague.

Defendants are not required to “continuously reassert their demand,” but “the strength of the demand is likely 8 to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted.” see Johnson , d at 16 (indicating that whether the demand is “prompt” and “forceful” is key to a court’s evaluation of a speedy- trial claim).

9 C. Strength of speedy-trial demand A defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight.” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 514 at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. 2192-93).

Assertion of right A defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight.” (quotation omitted).

See, n.1 (Minn. 1989) (noting that the district court “should have refused to hear the mot ion to vacate judgment since the judgment of conviction was being appealed ”); In re Welfare of C. Children , d 5 94, 99 (Minn. App. 1984) (stating that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to modify a dispositi

not require a finding that Robinson knowingly was present in a vehicle with a firearm, which could result in his being deprived of his liberty “for factors outside of his control.” In response, the state argues that the condition is not invalid because it was “reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing” and was not “unduly restrictive of [his] liberty or autonomy.”

Assertion of right A “defendant’s assertion of the right [to a speedy trial] is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” (quotation omitted).

d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989).