Cited by

a criminal-sexual-conduct case, the supreme court affirmed the denial of a plea-withdrawal motion and, in discussing the prejudice requirement of the fair-and-just standard, stated that the district court “ was not unjustified in considering the interests of the victim.” Id.

“Underlying the rule is the notion that giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”

This court reviews the denial of a motion for plea withdrawal under the fair -and- just standard for an abuse of discretion and will reverse a district court’s decision “only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).

(d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989)).

We review a district court’s denial of a plea-withdrawal motion under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” Raleigh, d at 97.

“We review a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, reversing only 7 in the ‘rare case.’” Raleigh, d at 97 ()

Appellate courts review “a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, reversing only in the rare case.” (quotation omitted); -66 (Minn. 1989) (rejecting more lenient approach to presentence guilty plea withdrawals).

This court reviews a district court’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 4 under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” see also Raleigh, d at 97.

This court reviews a district court ’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” see also Raleigh, d at 97.

d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).

Second, in analyzing whether Baion presented a fair-and-just reason for withdrawal.

Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.” Raleigh, d at 97.

d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).

We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, and only the “rare case” merits reversal

State v. Jones , rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

Reversal is appropriate only in the “rare case.”

Doing so would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”

8 Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty pl ea “for any reason or without good reason” would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”

The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.”

Underlying this rule is the principle that “giving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentence would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”

(noting that district court “was not unjustified in considering the interests of the victim”).

Kim v. State , , 266 (Minn. 1989) (quotation omitted); see also Mader , 251 F.3d at 1104-05 (explaining that allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea without a fair and just reason "would degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a move in a game of chess" (quotation omitted) ).

We review a district court’s denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion, and will only reverse such a denial in a “rare case.” Kim v. State

(quotation and citation omitted).

The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a plea “is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can 5 fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.”

A district court has discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and its decision will only be reversed if an appellate court “can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

Allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “for any reason or without good reason” would “undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”

“The ultimate decision is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [distric t] court abused its discretion.” d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).

D E C I S I O N A district court has discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and its decision will only be reversed if an appellate court can “fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

“The ultimate decision is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court, and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which th e appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

“We review a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, reversing only in the ‘rare case.’” (quoting Kim v. State , ).

See Kim v. State, 10 (considering victim’s interests in weighing prejudice).

a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.” The rule provides that “[t]he [district] court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion [to withdraw] and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Id.; see also Kim v. State , (“If a guilty plea can be withdrawn for any reason or without good reason at any time before sentence is im

The ultimate decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the district •court, “and it will be reversed only in the rare ease in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion.”

A district court has discretion when determining whether or not to allow a guilty plea withdrawal under the “fair and just” standard, and this court will reverse only in the “rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.” 6 Reiten argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he offered new evidence establishing the victim had recanted earlier statements and that Reiten had a medical con