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For example, we held that the odor of alcohol emanating from a vehicle is not a per se justification for law enforcement to search a vehicle for open containers of alcohol.

The test for appropriateness, in turn, is based on a “balancing of the government’s need to search or seize and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” (quotation omitted); d 379, 384 (Minn. 2003).

-91 (Minn. 2005) (holding that “a [person’s] nervous behavior .

d 697, 702-03 (Minn. 2024) (stating that, “[w]here appropriate, the totality of the circumstances may be analyzed by looking first to each identified fact supporting reasonable suspicion independently and then considering whether those facts, even if independently weak, are sufficient in the aggregate”); -91 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that police did not have reasonable suspicion of drug possession justifying a search of appellant’s vehicle and stating that “[e]ach of these factors is weak evidenc

Second, in State v. Burbach —on which the Torgerson court relied —the court concluded that “an officer’s detection of the odor of alcohol coming from an adult passenger during a traffic stop does not, by itself , provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion of an open-container violation sufficient to permit an officer to expand the traffic stop by requesting to search the vehicle.” (emphasis added).

But the scope of an investigatory vehicle stop “must be limited to the justification for the stop.” (quotation omitted).

at 168-69 (quoting Lester, d at 771), that must be particularized and individualized to the suspect

Each of those circumstances, by itself, is “weak evidence of drug possession.”

“When evaluating tips, courts are to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (quotation omitted).

at 487-88 (considering the relevance and significance of the objective facts independently before considering them in totality); -91 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that police did not have reasonable suspicion of drug possession justifying a search of appellant’s vehicle and stating that “[e]ach of these factors is weak evidence of drug possession, and they are also weak in the aggregate”).

at 487-88 (considering the relevance and significance of the objective facts independently before considering them in totality); -91 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that police did not have reasonable suspicion of controlled-substance possession justifying a search of appellant’s vehicle and stating that “[e]ach of these factors is weak evidence of drug possession, and they are also weak in the aggregate”).

On appeal, appellant alleges that the evidence to support the search of his vehicle was insufficient and should have been suppressed.1 DECISION This court “undertake[s] a de novo review to determine whether a search or seizure is justified by reasonable suspicion or by probable cause.” d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).

at 168-69 (), that must be particularized and individualized to the suspect

6 odor of marijuana, neither officer observed any indicia of impairment, and neither officer saw any contraband or substances in plain view.2 The district court explained that Minnesota case law does not permit vehicle searches solely because adult passengers smell like alcohol, and analogized that the same analysis should apply to the odor of marijuana, given that possession of a certain amount of marijuana is a non-criminal petty misdemeanor, see Minn. Stat. §§ 152.027, subd.

When the facts are undisputed, “our review is entirely de novo.”

In making this argument, which held that nervous behavior is not enough to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

1 -91 (Minn. 2005) ( holding that Burbach’s nervous behavior, an unsubstantiated tip that the vehicle Burbach was driving was involved in transporting cocaine, and speeding did not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related activity to justify the expansion of the traffic stop to request a vehic

In par ticular, under Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, “the sc ope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop.”

State v. Burbach , (determining that defendant’s demeanor, “which was nervous, fidgety, and talkative in a way that the o fficer found more extreme than usual” did not contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion); Syhavong, d at 282 (noting that a defendant’s nervousness “must be coupled with other par