Cited by

The supreme court has stated that, in order to prove aiding and abetting under subdivision 1, “the State has to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the crime and ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’” State v. Clark , ().

–54 (Minn. 2008) (“The precise quantum of corroborative evidence needed necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case, but corroborative evidence does not need to be sufficient to .

is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.” (quoting Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)).

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1978)

Further, the cautionary instructions given by the district court “lessen[ed] the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the [ Spreigl] evidence.” (holding that district court’s cautionary instructions regarding permissible uses of Spreigl evidence “minimized” concerns about potential for undue prejudice); (stating that appellate courts presume jury followed cautionary instructions).

(“[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”).

Finally, and in any event, the district court’s repeated cautionary instructions “lessen[ed] the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the [Spreigl] evidence.” (holding that the district court’s cautionary instructions regarding permissible uses of Spreigl evidence “minimized” concerns about the potential for undue prejudice); cf. Buchan, d at 626-27 (concluding that any error in admitting Spreigl evidence was harmless in part because the distri

d 241, 256 (Minn. 2008) (requiring reviewing court to consider insufficient-evidence argument, even when conviction reversed on other grounds, to determine whether retrial would violate Double Jeopardy Clause).

o be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of the defendant ’s guilt or sustain a conviction,” but rather, the corroborative evidence “need only link the defendant to the crime in some substantial degree [that] tends to affirm the truth of [the accomplice’s] testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant.” Staunton v. State , (-54 (Minn. 2008)).

e notice of its intent to use the evidence; (2) the State must clearly indicate what the evidence is being offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the other act; (4) the Spreigl evidence must be relevant and material; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by the potential prejudice.” State v. Clark

We have explained that “corroborating evidence need only be sufficient to restore confidence in the truthfulness of the accomplice’s testimony.” 21 (Minn. 2008).

See State v. Clark , (“[W]e must also address [appellant’s] sufficiency argument to determine whether the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial or a judgment of acquittal.” (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978))).

Thao, d at 840; Griffin, d at 262

testimony] does not need to be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt or sustain a conviction,” but rather, the corroborative evidence “need only link the defendant to the crime in some substantial degree [that] tends to affirm the truth of [the accomplice’s] testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant.” Staunton, d at 297 (-54 (Minn. 2008)).

at 858, including looking to other sections in the same chap ter to avoid conflic ting interpretations, 6 see also Cent.

When considering whether th e record included evidence sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony, appellate courts consid er whether the corrobo rating evidence is “weighty enough to restore confidence in th e truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Clark , ( quotation omitted).

Moreover, “[c]ircu mstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Clark , -59 (Minn. 2008).

d 241, 251 (Minn. 2008).

In Minnesota, “a criminal conviction ca nnot be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” see also Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2010) (“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboratio n is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission o

A. Corroboration Corroborative evidence “is sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony when it is weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Clark , (quotation omitted).

6 The supreme court has held that, accordingly, “as a rule, trial courts have a duty to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.” (quotation omitte d).

State v. Clark , , 251 (Minn. 2008) ; see Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2018) ("A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the of

State v. Clark , , 251-58 (Minn. 2008).

See, e.g. , State v. Clark , , 258-59 (Minn. 2008) (addressing issues likely to recur upon retrial to offer guidance and in the interest of preserving judicial resources).

The burden of corroboration is met when “the defendant is linked to the alleged crime by corroborating evidence that in some substantial degree tends to affirm the truth of the accomp lice’s testimony and to point to the guilt of the defendant.” State v. Clark , (quotation omitted).

d 241, 251 (Minn. 2008).

If each prong is met, a reviewing court “must then consider whether reversal of [the defendant’s] conviction is necessary to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial process.”

d 241, 258-59 (Minn. 2008).

fect substantial rights when prosecutor’s improper questions covered less than one page of 64 pages of 3 While the state’s evidence tying Hanson to possession of the shotgun after April 2012 is far from overwhelming, we do not find it so legally insufficient that “the only just remedy is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.” 258 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted) (concluding that remand for new trial due to plain error was appropriate and did not trigger double jeopardy clause because there

This rule reflects a distrust of accomplice testimony because accomplices may testify against another for immunity or clemency or for “other self-serving or malicious motives.” (quotation omitted).

But “whether the evidence sufficiently corroborates the accomplice’s testimony is a legal question that we review de novo.”

(holding that remand is not permitted where the state’s evidence in the first trial was legally insufficient, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause).