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“[E]vidence 7 “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

6 A warrantless search is “per se unreasonable.”

9 “When reviewing a district court ’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court ’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

I. Decision Denying Mason’s Motion to Suppress We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings underlying a decision whether to suppress evidence, State v. Gauster , and we review de novo whether a n investigative detention or pat-down search is justified by reasonable suspicion, .

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” (quoting State v. Jordan , ).

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” ().

DECISION “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” ().

“Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.”

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” ().

d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) .

Further, the scope of a search under the automobile exception is “defined by the object of the search” and limited to “the places in which there is probable cause to believe [the object] may be found.” (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).

to be within the curtilage of a home.” (cataloguing cases that hold that the driveway and backyard are curtilage in 3 “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” ().

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted).

“Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.” State v. 4 Gauster

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court ’s legal determinations de novo.’” 5 (Minn. 2008) ().

In considering the denial of a suppression motion, “we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” (quotation omitted); see Diede, d at 843 (“The de novo review standard controls our review of the district court’s determination that its factual findings support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the police officer’s search or seizure.”).

Further, the scope of a search under the automobile exception is “defined by the object of the search” and limited to “the places in which there is p robable cause to believe [the object] may be found.” (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).

from the center console.” But he argues that “the further search of the car, particularly the search of the bag where the shotgun was found, exceeded the scope of the probable cause.” “The scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe the object may be found.” (quotations omitted).

State v. Gauster , d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” 5 (Minn. 2008) ().

d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

I. Motion to Suppress A. Multiple-Occupancy Residence “When reviewing a district court’s pretri al order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual finding s under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , (quotation omitted).

While warrantless searches ar e generally unreasonable, State v. Gauster , an officer may conduct a warrantless limited investigatory stop when the officer has reasonable artic ulable suspicion of criminal activity.

“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a mo tion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.’ ” ().