Cited by

Peltier, d at 804; (“Prosecutors may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence.”).

Trial strategy includes “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object.”

Under the first prong of the test, this court determines “whether counsel ’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (quotation omitted).

12 C. Closing Argument Not Based on Reasonable Inferences A prosecuting attorney’s closing argument “should be based on [the] evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.” State v. Bauer , (quotation omitted), aff’d, (concluding that an argument in closing was based on “a reasonable inference” because “some evidence” supported it).

(“What evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.”); (notin

ty, d 89, 106 (Minn. 2009), attempting to bring inadmissible evidence to the attention of the jury, “inflaming the jury’s passions and prejudices against the defendant,” (quotation omitted), and discussing facts not in evidence during closing argument

The state “may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence.”

It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” (quotations omitted).

Remedies “should be appropriate to the violation, and a retrial is not required if a remand will remedy the violation.”

“Questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo.”

Such “[q]uestions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo.” State v. Bobo

(describing a district court’s consideration of excluding specific individuals likely to intimidate a witness as a reasonable alternative).

d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009).

It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” (quotations omitted).

d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (“What evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.”).

“What evidence to present to the [factfinder], what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.”

But “[p]rosecutors may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence or that are designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury.”

d 129, 142 (Minn. 2009).

-43 10 (Minn. 2009) (stating that attorneys “may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence”).

(declining to review for competency trial counsel’s claimed failures to vigorously cross-examine a witness and to object to Spreigl testimony); (stating that whether to object is part of trial counsel’s strategy and “will generally not be reviewed later for competence”).

“Counsel acts within that objective standard of reasonableness when the attorney provides the client with the representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

In particular, “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.”

The remedy for denying a defendant’s right to a public trial “should be appropriate to the violation, and a retrial is not required if a remand will remedy the violation.” see Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 (remanding a case for a public suppression hearing when the closure of the previous suppression hearing violated the defendant’s right to a public trial and holding that if the same evidence were suppressed at the new hearing, there would be no new trial).

While the unconstitutional closure of a courtroom is generally considered to be a structural error that requires automatic reversal, the state argues that a plain-error standard of review applies here because McClendon did not object to the courtroom limitations at trial.