Cited by

(applying circumstantial-evidence standard because “direct evidence [was] insufficient by itself to prove” element of offense), rev. denied (Minn. June 24, 2013)).

“But if the state introduced direct evidence on each element of an offense, the supreme court does not apply the circumstantial -evidence standard of revi ew.” State v. Porte

The state does not so much as mention the term “harmless.” We have previously warned that, when the state bears the burden to establish an error’s harmlessness in a direct appeal, its “failure to assert a harmless-error argument in its responsive brief is a waiver of the harmlessness issue, unless it is obvious that the district court’s error was harmless.” (quotation omitted).

In identifying the circumstances proved, appellate courts defer “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2023) ().

-10 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard of review because state introduced insufficient direct evidence).

with circumstantial evidence” by pointing to “the large quantity of drugs [the defendant] possessed, evidence as to the manner of packaging, and other evidence.” (quotation omitted).

-313 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating the general principle that “issues that are not raised by an appellant on appeal are deemed waived unless prejudicial errors are obvious from the 8 (quotation omitted).

And, in general, “issues th at are not raised by appellant on appeal are deemed waived unless prejudicial errors are obvious from the record.” -13 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted).

(stating that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants higher scrutiny).

d 465, 477 (Minn. 2004) (stating that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants higher scrutiny).

v. Barajas, (defendant’s fingerprint found on the bag of drugs); State v. Porter, 674, N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. App. 2004) (defendant admitted to police that the drugs were his); State v. Porte , (witness testified that he gave defendant the drugs).

“Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession” and controlled substances may be constructively possessed by “more than one person.” (quotation omitted).

In other words, “[w]hether we apply the standard of review applicable to circumstantial evidence depends on whether the c onviction necessarily depends on circumstantial evidence.”

-10 (Minn. App. 2013) (-06 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., 7 concurring)) (applying a direct-evidence test first to determine sufficiency when the state offered direct and circumstantial evidence of a disputed element).

16, 2016) (-13 (Minn. App. 2013)) (holding—in a nonprecedential opinion we cite for its persuasive value—that the state’s failure to file a brief constituted waiver of the substantial-rights prong).

“Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.” (quotation omitted).

See Matthews, d at 550; -14 (Minn. App. 2013) (declining to review sua spontae whether erroneous jury instructions were harmless because the state argued only that no error occurred and thereby waived the argument that any error was harmless).

State v. Porte , ( 6 (Minn. 2010)).

“Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.” (quotation omitted).

-10 (Minn. App. 2013) (discussing heightened standard of review for circumstantial evidence), review denied (Minn. Jun.

And although the supreme court has stated that it “may assume that in a direct appeal, the state’s failure to assert a harmless -error argument in its responsive brief is waiver of the harmlessness issue,” the court explained that there is an exception if “it is ‘obvious’ that the district court’s error was harmless.”

see also State v. Porte , - 10 (Minn. App. 2013) (discussing heightened standard of review for circumstantial evidence).

State v. Porte , see also Bernhardt v. State

at 473; 9 (Minn. App. 2013).

see also Bernhardt v. State , , 477 (Minn. 2004) (stating that a higher level of scrutiny is warranted if a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence) .

-10 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. June 16, 2015).

See State v. Harris , (noting that d irect 8 v. Porte