Cited by

Deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and assum ing that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and 9 disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” State v. Porte , (quotation omitted), we conclude that sufficient evidence supports appellant’s conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

“A convictio n based on circumstantial evidence receives heightened scrutiny on appellate review.” State v. Porte , (quotation omitted).

Convictions based on circumstantial evidence ar e subject to “heightened scrutiny.” State v. Porte , (quotation omitted).

Because intent to sell is typically proven by circumstantial evidence, we apply the circumstantial-evidence standard.

d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

First, “[p]roximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.” See State v. Porte , (quotation omitted).

See Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc. , n.3 (Minn. 2004); n.1 (Minn. App. 2013).

3(c) (2018); Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc. , n.3 (Minn. 2004); n.1 (Minn. App. 2013).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court “conducts a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the [fact-finder] to reach a verdict of guilty.” (quotation omitted).

(recognizing that intent to sell or distribute controlled substances typically is proved with circumstantial evidence).

is is a circumstantial case,” but argues that the evidence is sufficient for Kowalzyk’s conviction.3 When appellate courts review a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach a verdict of guilty.” (quotation omitted).

d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

d 465, 477 (Minn. 2004).

See State v. Porte , , 308 (Minn. App. 2013).

d 465, 477 (Minn. 2004).

The third prong—whether substa ntial rights were 2 “It is a well-established rule that any claims not argued by the parties are deemed waived unless prejudicial errors are obvious from the record.” n.2 (Minn. 2009); -14 (Minn. App. 2013) (declining to decide whether a trial error was harmless because the state failed to raise the issue).

3(c) (2018); Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc., n.3 (Minn. 2004); n.1 (Minn. App. 2013).

See State v. Horst , Bernhardt v. State

3(c) (201 8); Vlahos v. R & I Constr., Inc. , n.3 (Minn. 2004); n.1 (Minn. App. 2013).

At the second st age of review, we “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotations omitted).

Intent to sell a controlled substance is typically proved by circumstantial evidence, “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute exi sted or did not exist.” (quotation omitted)

*765 State v. Porte , , 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

We apply a two-step analysis requiring us to first identify the circumstances proved and then “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from th e circumstances proved,” including “inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotations omitted).

(citing Al–Naseer, d at 473–75).

In reviewing the sufficiency of circum stantial evidence, we first identify the circumstances proved and then “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotations omitted).

Usually, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we “conduct[] ‘a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction,’ is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach a verdict of guilty.” ().

We first identify the circumstances proved and defer to the jury’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances.” State v. Porte