Cited by

counsels that the use of “the,” as in the phrase “the sexual abuse,” demonstrates that the legislature 14 reincorporated the statute’s earlier limitations.

“If the [l]egislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” - 85 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

(“Resort to legislative history to interpret a statute is generally appropriate only where the statute itself is ambiguous.”); (“We do not need to resort to legislative history when a statute is unambiguous.”); n.5 (Minn. 2015) (“We will not re-write an unambiguous statute to conform to what may be the Legislature’s intent.”); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16(7) (“When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters[,] .

Because “the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language,” we “interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” –85 (Minn. 2015).

Because “the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language,” we “interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” –85 (Minn. 2015).

Nor will we “re-write an unambiguous statute to conform to what may be the Legislature’s intent.” n.5 (Minn. 2015).

“A mere potential to cause bodily harm through the transfer of bodily fluids or feces does not satisfy the legal standard for bodily harm.”

Double jeopardy is implicated when offenses are “identical,” that is, “the same in both law and fact.”

(“Because the transfer of bodily fluids .

When “the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” – 85 (M inn.

He argued that his fourth-degree-assault conviction effectively was invalidated by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s which was issued after his conviction became final.

(“While the threshold for what constitutes bodily harm under section 609.02, subdivision 7, is minimal, our legal standard nonetheless requires proof of pain or discomfort.”).

“If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, then we interpret the statute a ccording to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory construction.” –85 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

see also State v. Guzman , (“If we conclude that the alleged error was harmless, we need not decide whether the district court erred in giving the instruction in question.”).

The exclusion, however, refers to “the licensing,” a definite article, rather than “a license.” (“It is textually significant that the Legislature used ‘the,’ rather than ‘an,’ for example.”).

Statutory interpretation requires that we “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018); State v. Struzyk , 6 (Minn. 2015).

Second, to the extent the state is commenting about Li’s trial testimony rather than his on-scene claims, the reasoning ignores the fact that the state bore the burden of proving the disputed element, and that Li bore no burden to disprove the element.

We give words and phrases within a statute their ordinary meaning, and may consult dictionary definitions to determine an undefined term’s common meaning, State v. Thonesavanh

(“We read and cons true a statute as a whole and interpret each section in light of th e surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.”).

“The objective of st atutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Struzyk , 4 (Minn. 2015).

7 is “minimal,” but “nonetheless requires proof of pain or discomfort.”

(“We read and construe a statute as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.”).10 Here, there is no dispute that the City followed the procedures outlined in section 115A.94, and there is no dispute that the City Council decid

“The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.”

State v. Struzyk , , 284-85 (Minn. 2015).

“The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.”

Riggs , d at 684 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Struzyk , , 286 (Minn. 2015) ("It is textually significant that the Legislature used 'the,' rather than 'an,' for example."); Clark v. Ritchie , , 149 (Minn. 2010) ("Use of the definite article 'the' to modify 'appointment' indicates that the drafters were referring to a specific appointment ....").

State v. Struzyk , , 289 (Minn. 2015).

If the statute’s language is ambiguous, the courts “may consider the canons of statutory construction to ascertain its meaning.”

State v. Struzyk , , 284-85 (Minn. 2015).

“The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.”