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“A decision of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the federal constitution that is textually identical to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force.”

See Askerooth, d at 369 (stating that “there is no basis to believe that lack of identification, without more,” made it reasonable to expand a traffic stop); -29, 137 (Minn. 2002) (determining that an officer cannot expand the scope of a routine traffic stop by conducting a drug dog sniff without reasonable suspicion); (“Police officers may not ordinarily make searches upon apprehending motorists for simple traffic v

“Expansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

An officer may also incrementally expand a stop to conduct a limited investigation “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

A valid traffic stop may be expanded to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity, but “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

A traffic stop supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion may be expanded to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity but “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

State v. Wiegand , see also Garding , d at 702 (applying Wiegand).

An 6 officer may also incrementally expand a stop to conduct a limited investigation “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.” .

of the Minnesota Constitution, any expansion of the scope of the stop “not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the stop permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity.” (citing State v. Askerooth, 8 -65 (Minn. 2004)); (explaining that “[e]xpansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity” requires “reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity”).

in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that bringing a narcotics-detection dog to the scene of a traffic stop is an expansion of the stop that requires reasonable, articulable suspicion.

See Burbach, d at 490-91; 137 (Minn. 2002); cf. Smith, d at 352-54.

d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (“Law enforcement may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains provided they act diligently and reasonably.” (quotation omitted)).

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S 873, 881 (1975)

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21).

(stating there must be objectively articulable facts of criminal activity); (determining that a drug dog sniff was not justified 8 where the driver was evasive, nervous, and shaking, and noting that “acting suspiciously is not an articulable basis to suspect criminal activity,” and where “the officer indicated no reason to suspect drug-related activity”).

To justify a dog sniff of the exterior of a motor vehicle, police must have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.” (emphasis added).

“When reviewing the legality of a search or seizure, an appellate court will not reverse the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

An officer can expand the scope of a stop to include investigation of additional criminal activity “only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

It must last only as long as necessary to “effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (quotation 5 omitted).

The stop may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), and its scope must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).

135 (Minn. 2002) (holding that reasonable, articulable suspicion is required to expand a stop for an equipment violation before conducting an exterior dog sniff of a vehicle); United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that “a dog sniff of a car parked on a public street or alley .

These principles set out 6 in Terry apply to motor vehicle stops for minor traffic violations and the expansion of such stops to “conduct a narcotics-detection dog sn iff around the exterior of a motor vehicle.”

Thus, each subsequent intrusion “m ust be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible.” State v. Wiegand , (Mi nn.

if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”

13 reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity—that is, conduct that is a crime under Minnesota law—to expand the scope of a traffic stop.7 The State, however, highlights several pa ssages from prior decisions where we upheld the expansion of a traffic stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion of “illegal activity.” See, (“Expansion of the scope of the stop to include investigation of other suspected illegal activity is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only if the officer ha

if there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand

But p olice may conduct limited investigative stops based on a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Wiegand

The police may conduct a dog sniff around the exterior of a motor vehicle if they have “reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.”

See Askerooth, d at 361; Fort, d at 418–19; (notin g that Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution “impos es a reasonableness limitati on on both the duration and scope of a ‘Terry detention’ ” in the context of a traffic stop).

An officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate other suspected criminal activity “onl y if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.”

Although a dog sniff around the exterior of a car is not a search requiring probable cause under these provisions, it is “intrusive to some degree.” State v. Wiegard