Cited by

See George, d at 578; (holding that an officer who reasonably suspects that a driver is speeding can perform a traffic stop).

But “any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.”

Under the Minnesota Constitution, “any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.”

Id.; (concluding that “investigative questioning” related to the presence of weapons and narcotics expanded the scope of a routine traffic stop); Syhavong, d at 281 (concluding that officer expanded the scope of an equipment-violation stop by asking the driver if there was anything illegal in

“[U]nder Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.”

(concluding that “investigative questioning” related to the presence of weapons and narcotics expanded the scope of a routine traffic stop); Syhavong, d at 281 (concluding that officer unlawfully expanded the scope of an equipment- violation stop by asking the driver if there was anythi

But “the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop.”

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “held that a passenger of a car is considered seized ‘if a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not feel free to disregard the police questions or to terminate the encounter.’” n.3 (Minn. 2021) ().

-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding no reasonable suspicion to expand a traffic stop for speeding and a cracked windshield to include questions about drugs and weapons); Sargent, d at 40-42 (holding that questions about pretrial release conditions were questions about noncriminal activity unrelated to a traf

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “held that a passenger of a car is considered seized ‘if a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not feel free to disregard the police questions or to terminate the encounter.’” n.3 (Minn. 2021) ().

8 allows them to make inferences about physical symptoms that may elude lay observers); (noting officers may consider “the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under observation” to establish reasonable suspicion); Lugo, 8

t”); Wiegand, d at 128, 136-37 (concluding officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to justify drug-dog sniff, despite testimony that appellant was “evasive, nervous and had glossy eyes,” because officer did not conclude that defendant was under the influence of any drugs or indicate a reason to suspect drug-related activity); (concluding that officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion supporting investigation for presence of narcotics when s

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809- 10 (1996)

“[T]he scope and duration of a traffic stop must be limited to the justification for the stop.”

ciples in mind , we turn to the issue of first impression before us: whether a law enforcement officer may expand th e scope of a traffic stop to investigate a passenger’s potential violation of a condition of their pretrial release.4 “Any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.” (emphasis added).

-17, 419 (Minn. 2003) (finding that a passenger displaying signs of nervousness and that stop occurred in high-crime area did not justify expanding the stop); (finding the strong smell of cologne, presence of cigars, and prior reports of crime in the area to

In par ticular, under Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution, “the sc ope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop.”

See State v. Fort , -19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that officer expanded scope of traffic stop by ordering passenger out of vehicle and questioning him about drug-re lated activity).

(holding that a police officer impermissibly expanded the scope of a routine traffic stop, in violation of the Minnesota Constitution, by asking the passenger about weapons and drugs without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic offense).

Any expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop “must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.” (quotation omitted).

See, (noting that the car appellant was in “was stopped for speeding and a cracked windshield, both of which are violations of traffic laws” and that, therefore, the officers had “a basis for stopping the car for further investigation” of the traffic law violations); -6

Here, the district court determined —and we agree —that the initial stop was first expanded beyond its original purpose when Butler requested that the driver join him in the squad car “to investigate the possibility of further criminal activity.”

“Investigative stops are permitted if there is a particularized basis for suspecting criminal activity.” State v. Fort , .

State v. Fort , -19 (Minn. 2003).

See, , review denied (Minn. Aug.

See, -10 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Aug.

al activity); Burbach, d at 846, 490 (concluding that a driver behaving “significantly more nervous, fidgety, and talkative than a normally nervous person in a traffic stop” while the officer “intense[ ly]” questioned her about drugs, along with her speeding and an unsubstantiated tip about cocaine possession, did not support reasonable suspicion of illegal activity); 17-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that there was no reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity where the driver was stopped in a

ope as improper because, a fter he issued a warning for the taillights and expired license, Deputy Cawcutt continued his investigative questioning by asking her “to confirm that [he] heard right, that she was coming from her house.” “[A]ny expansion of the scope or duration of a traffic stop must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity.”

However, “in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion a consent-based search obtained by exploitation of a routine traffic stop that exceeds the scope of the stop’s underlying justification is invalid.”

Askerooth, d at 364; -19 (Minn. 2003).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996)