Cited by

“E ven if a court’s comments are not always appropriate, appellate courts will not intervene unless the comments were prejudicial, biased or deprived plaintiffs of their right to a fair trial.” (quotation omitted).

of D.F., (applying harmless-error review in a juvenile-protection context); -76 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that, although “[i]t was a mistake for the trial court .

“Even if a [district] court’s comments are not always appropriate, appellate courts will not intervene unless the comments were ‘prejudicial, biased or deprived plaintiffs of their right to a fair trial.’” ().

(applying harmless-error analysis to affirm termination of parental rights).

A district court “is required to take into account [a] child’s wishes[,]” but the preferences of a child are not dispositive.

(“We cannot determine prejudice where there is little indication that the court considered evidence from prior records, no showing that use of the material otherwise materially affected the result, and no showing of an offer of proof to contradict information that might have been used by the

(declining to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error).

(refusing to reverse termi nation of parental rights for harmless error) ; - 40 (Minn. App. 1995) ( refusing to reverse termination for harmless error ) (implicitly overruled on other grounds by (Minn. 1

Consistent with rule 3.02, this court has recognized that a district court may take judicial notice of “[c]ourt records an d files 29 from prior adjudicative proceedings.”

(declining to remand in a child -custody matter); d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (refusing to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error); - 31 (Minn. App. 2022) (citing D.J.N.).

Still, mother’s argument fails because she does not show the district court’s use of exhibit 57 “materially affected the result.”

Consistent with rule 3.02, this court has recognized that a district court may take judicial notice of “[c]ourt records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings.” (Mi nn.

(concluding that although the trial court’s comments were “not always appropriate,” there is an “appropriate reduction in concern for the content of questions and the tone of voice of a trial judge in a bench trial”).

(declining to reverse TPR decision for harmless error).

(declining to reverse TPR for harmless error); In re Welfare of Child.

(applying 17 harmless-error analysis to due -process argument); d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (declining to reverse TPR for harmless error); see also In re Welfare of Child.

(declining to reverse termination of parental rights where appellants failed to demonstrate that a district court’s error caused prejudice); In re Welfare of Child.

(dis cussing propriety of district court taking judicial notice of prior court file); n.5 (Minn. 2021) (discussing judicial notice in juvenile-protection matters).

-75 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that court records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings are an appropriate subject of judicial notice by the district court).

(refusing to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error).

v. Midway Ctr., Inc., (stating that, to obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must show both error by the district court and prejudice to the appellant arising from that error); (applying Midway in a TPR appeal), rev. dismissed (Minn. May 3, 2005); -76 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that, while “[i]t was a mistake for the [district] court .

(refusing to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error).

7 “[c]ourt records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings are an appropriate subject for judicial notice.” -75 (Minn. App. 1997).

(discussing propriety of di strict court taking judicial notice of prior court file).

Consistent with rule 3.02, this court has recognized that a district court may take judicial notice of “court records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings.”

v. Midway Ctr., Inc. , (stating that, to obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must show both error by the district court and prejudice to the appellant arising from that error); (applying Midway in an appeal of TPR); -76 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that, although “[i]t was a mistake for the trial court .

or the county attorney, may take judicial notice only of findings of fact and court orders in the juvenile protection court file and in any other proceeding in any other court file involving the child or the child’s parent.” This court has recognized that a district court may take judicial notice of “court records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings.”

(citing Block v. Target Stores, Inc., -13 (Minn. App. 1990) (criticizing trial judg e for lengthy and sarcastic q uestioning of a witness especially because of the possibl e effect on the jury’s view of the case), review denied (Minn. Sept.

-175 (Minn. App. 10 1997).

(explaining that “the record reflects somewhat harsh responses and questioning by the [district] court” but nevertheless determining that “the [district] court’s behavior did not reflect bias against appellants”).

(finding error in a juveni le-protection case but not reversing because appellant was not prejudiced).

(refusing to reverse a termination of parental rights for harmless error).

-76 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that, although “[i]t was a mistake for the trial court .

(“[An affected party] is entitled to notice that identifies the portions of the record that the court will consider in determining adjudicative facts in the case.”).

(refusing to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error); (applying harmless-error analysis to due-process argument).

Appellant argues in the alternative that he was entitled to notice of the district court’s intention to rely on the decisions in the underlying action, (it was error for the district court to use prior files without notice of expected use).