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In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

(“E ven observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify an officer stopping a driver.”); (upholding the traffic stop of a vehicle driving slow and “weaving within its lane”)

7(1) (2022) (requiring vehicle to be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane”); -26 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because driver crossed and recrossed fog line); 109 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that officer had reasonable suspicion because driver committed multiple “violations of the traffic laws,”

When considering whether there is reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a stop, we consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

“In determining whether a stop is justified, we consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

Cf. Anderson, d at 824 (concluding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop because his interpretation of the law was erroneous, and he therefore lacked a particularized and objective basis for stopping the driver); d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (-22 (Minn. 1996)) (explaining that “it is not necessary that the police detect an actual violation of the law” to conduct an investigatory stop).

6 (Minn. App. 2001) (“[C]ontinuous weaving within one’s own lane is sufficient by itself to create a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support a traffic stop.”); (“Even observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify an officer stopping a driver.”); (holding that an officer may stop a vehicle weaving within its lane to investigate the cause of the unusual driving).

in State v. Richardson, the supreme court held that “[a] police officer who, after receiving a police radio dispatch relaying a motorist’s report that a motor vehicle was being driven erratically, observed the same vehicle cross and recross the fog line, possessed 11 an objective basis for reasonable suspicion warranting an investigative stop.” d 823, 824 (Minn. 2001).

(citizen reported vehicle as driving “all over the road” and responding officer saw it cross fog lines multiple times); (officer saw vehicle driving “exceptionally” slowly and weaving within lane as officer followed); Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub.

(concluding that reasonable suspicion supported traffic stop where car was reported to be driving “all over the road” and police officer observed the car “cross and recross the fog line”).

d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrai ned person.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exis ts to justify a stop, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that w ould be beyond the 4 competence of an untrained person.”

Trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person, but they may not act on “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Klamar, d at 691 (citation omitted)

Trained law enforcement officers are “permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

See, (concluding that officer who had observed 4 a vehicle “weaving within its lane .

In considering whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances a nd acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” -89 (Minn. 2000) (noting we are deferential to police officer training and experience) .

“Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute and the decision to suppress is a question of law, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a m atter of law, the ev idence 5 needs to be suppressed.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the 9 competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson

In doing so, they “acknow ledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

5 In determining whether reasonable, articula ble suspicion exists to justify a stop, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deduc tions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , (“The court may consider the officer’s experien ce, general knowledge, and observations; background information, includ ing the nature of the offens e suspected and th

(“Even observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify an officer stopping a driver.”).

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deduction s that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , see also Klamar , d at 691 (“The court may consider the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense suspected

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop , Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the compe tence of an untrained person.”

But an officer need not “detect an actual violation of the law.”

5 In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enfo rcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained per son.” State v. Richardson

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop , Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances a nd acknowledge that trained law - enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the compe tence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson , see als o Klamar , d at 691 (“The court may consider the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature of the offense sus

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop , Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that tr ained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the compe tence of an untrained person.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are perm itted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson

Ho wever, “it is not necessary that the police detect an actual vi olation of the law.”

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”