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“Unlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence, probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a con viction.”

(stating that “probable cause to search exists [if] .

Probable cause “requires only a 8 probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (quotation omitted).

Probable cause requires only that the state demonstrate “a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

(stating that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be ‘largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants’ ” (quoting Wiley, d at 268)).

(articulating one through three); (articulating four through seven).

The probable-cause standard is “more than mere suspicion” but “less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” Id.; -91 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)) (explaining that this showing “is significantly less than that required to support a conviction” and that “probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity”).

at 623-24; (noting that under certain circumstances probable cause can be permissibly found in home of “drug wholesaler”); Novak, d at 832-33 (concluding that an affidavit established defendant as drug wholesaler due to drug transaction and known drug suspicion, which significantly contributed to

“Before searching a residence, police usually must obtain a valid warrant issued by 10 a neutral and detached magistrate.” ().

“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.” (emphasis added).

Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984)

“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.”

at 623 ( -33 (Minn. 1984)).

We consider all evidence “in a light most favorable to the conviction,” , including evidence before and after the killing, 5

“Unlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence, probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

–91 (Minn. 1999) (stating that certain allegations in a warrant affidavit lacked context to establish their relevance, raising “a genuine concern” that they were “stale or simply irrelevant,” but that other factual allegations were sufficient to establish probable cause)

(disregarding facts relevant to a district court’s probable cause determination because those facts were “unknown .

(“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.”).

When we perform a totality of the circumstances analysis on a warrant application, “[w]e defer to the issuing magistrate, recognizing that doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Fawcett, d at 385 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCloskey, d at 704); Wiley, d at 268.

See State v. Harris , (“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.”).

“Opportunity to commit a crime can support a finding of probable cause.” Holland, d at 674; (identifying opportunity as a nexus that can link a defendant to a crime).

Under the probable-cause standard, as distinct from proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, the state need only show “a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

See Bellcourt, d at 273; Russell, d at 113; Peou, d at 478; Darris, d at 239; State v. Fox , –24 (Minn. 2015); Webster , d at 784

see also State v. Harris , d 782, 787-88 (Minn. 1999); Papadakis, d at 355.

[It] requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted).

See Dixon, d at 729, 731 (–91 (Minn. 1999)).

“Unlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence, probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” -91 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less than that required to support a conviction.”

State v. Harris , -88 (Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Rochefort , -05 (Minn. 2001) 9 (noting our deferential standard is consistent with “the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant”) (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733, 104 S.

We afford “great deference to the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause” and limit our review to determining whether “the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Harris , -88 (Minn. 1999) (quotations omitted).

In State v. Harris, the supreme court held that “[s]o long as the underlying felony and the killing are part of one continuous transaction, it is irrelevant whether the felony took place before, after, or during the killing.” d 782, 792 (Minn. 1999).

“[ S]tatements from citiz en witnesses, as opposed to criminal informants, ma y be presumed to be credible.” State v. Harris

reasonable degree of medical certainty, McBride was the source of the bite marks at the base of Dillon’s penis, on the left side of Dillon’s scrotum, and on Dillon’s tongue”); d 430, 437–39 (Minn. 2000) (affirming convicti on based in part on physical evidence and on medical testimony that the victim died in the course of criminal sexual conduct); State v. Harris , (“Such evidence led the medical examiner to testify that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, McGrath had been sexually ass

1 (noting that person arrested without probable cause must be released) ; State v. Harris , -91 (Minn. 1999) (describing probable cause as lower standard than preponderance of evidence).

See Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2016); State v. Harris

State v. Harris , , 787 (Minn. 1999).