Cited by

spousal maintenance’ and an award ‘will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its discretion.’” Honke, d at 265 ().

Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a); n.5 (Minn. 2009).

A district court has “broad discretion regarding the division of property,” and its division of property “will only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion.” Lee v. Lee

explaining that “the term ‘payment’ generally means that a benefit must actually be received by the [party], as opposed to merely vested or owed, in order to constitute income.” The district court found: “While [wife] is allowed to take a 25% cash out at a significant tax penalty, she is not ent

(stating “[i]t is within the district court’s discretion to rule on a motion despite respondent’s late filings”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds

1, 8, .29 (2024); Lee v. Lee , n.5 (Minn. 2009) .

8, 518A.29 (2024); d 631, 635 & n.5 (Minn. 2009) (reviewing modification of spousal maintenance).

“In dissolution cases, the district court has broad discretion regarding the division of property, spousal maintenance and child support.”

n.5 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that “the legislature intended section 518A.29’s definition of gross income to apply to chapter 518”).

n.5 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the “income” from which spousal-maintenance payments are made is the “gross income” defined in section 518A.29).

15 (2022) (“‘[m]ay’ is permissive”)

(spousal maintenance); Lee v. Lee , (division of marital property); (attorney fees).

2(e) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.552); see also Honke, d at 267- 68; -36 (Minn. 2009); Madden, d at 696.

10 Husband’s challenge relates to the district court’s property division, over which “the district court has broad discretion.” Lee v. Lee

[An appellate court] will affirm the [district] court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though [the appellate court] might have taken a different approach.” (citation omitted); see Lee v. Lee , (stating that a district court has “broad discretion regarding the division of property” and that its division of property “will only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion”).

d 631, 642 (Minn. 2009) (remanding for reconsideration of maintenance award that exceeded recipient’s needs).

2(g)(6), did not require proof that Gle sener’s cocaine use was “habitual or excessive.” “[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

(holding that the district court can consider pension payments derived from benefits earned by the obli gor prior to and subsequent to marriage to the obligee wh en calculating a maintenan ce obligor’s ability to pay maintenance, while also holding that pensi on payments derived from benefits earn

In determining how much security to require, the district court should consider th e maintenance-recipient’s age, education, vocational experience, and employment prospects, Kampf, d at 635, as well as the insurability and the cost of life insurance to the person paying maintenance

[An appellate court] 9 will affirm the [district] court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though we might have taken a different approach.” Antone, d at, 100 (citation omitted); (stating that a district court has “broad discretion regarding the division of property” and that its division of property “will only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion”).

non -marital family trust for self -support); Curtis v. Curtis , -55 (Minn. 20 16) (considering the income potential of a stock portfolio awarded as part of a marital property award); Erlandson v. Erlandson , (considering the investment income from a non-marital, pre-dissolution personal injury award as a source of income); (calculating the income of the payor spouse to determine his ability to pay maintenance).

spousal maintenance” and an award “will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its discretion.” Lee v. Lee

See Lee v. Lee , n.10 (Minn. 2009) (stating that disadvantaged spouse should not be required to “invade the principal of the [distributed] property to pay living expenses”).

303.03(b) , but may relax enforcement if “the interests of justice would be best served by relieving a party from formal compliance ,” (quotation omitted), aff’d in part, rev’ d in part on other grounds

See Lee v. Lee , n.5 (Minn. 2009).

Rather, the [maintenance recipient] can expect a sum that will keep with the circumstances and living standards of the parties at the time of the divorce.” Lee v. Lee , (quotations omitted); see Peterka v. Peterka , (stating that the purpose of a maintenance award “is to allow the recipient and the obli gor to have a standard of living that approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the ci

(“It is within the district court’s discretion to rule on a motion despite [movant]’s late filings.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds

The discretion to set an effective date other than the date the motion was served “must be exercised based on the facts as found by the [decision-maker].” Lee v. Lee

See Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(f) (2018); see also Lee v. Lee , n.5 (Minn. 2009) (holding that the definition of gross income in section 518A.29 applies to both child support and spousal maintenance).

and potential income under section 518A.32.” n.5 (Minn. 2009).

” Id.; see also Lee v. Lee , n.5 (Minn. 2009) (stating the definition of “gross income” in Minn. Stat. § 518A.29 applies to calculations of spousal maintenance).

See Lee v. Lee , d 631, 642 (Minn. 2009) (“We have repeatedly stated that the support to which a divorced party is entitled is not simply that which will supply her with the bare necessities of life,” and “the obligee can expect a sum that will [keep] with the circumstances and living standards of the parties at the time of the divorce.

The district court has “broad discretion regarding the division of property ,” and its division of property “will only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion.” Lee v. Lee

d 631, 642-43 (Minn. 2009) (stating, in dicta, that “[i]nsurability and cost of insurance seem to us to be significant facts in determining .