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“In considering whether a statute is ambiguous, the statute must be construed as a whole and the words and sentences therein are to be understood in light of their context.” (quotations omitted); (“[W]e do not examine different provisions [of a statute] in isolation.”).

ones argues that his interpretation of the statute follows the canon of constitutional avoidance and “is the only one that avoids conflicts between section 624.713 and the Second Amendment.” “The constitutional avoidance canon requires that we avoid constitutional confrontations ‘if it is possible to do so.’” State v. Irby , n.5 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Gaiovnik , ).

Appellate courts “construe statutes as a whole so that statutory language is understood in context.” (“When interpreting statutes, [appellate courts] do not examine different provisions in isolation.”).

3 (2024), are generally forfeited on appeal, appellate courts “ will consider a challenge made outside of that period under ‘the narrow circumstances’ where the ‘only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution and that challenge was raised in the district court.’” d 313, 317 (Minn. 2025) (emphasis added) (

1(a); (holding that a district court’s authority to award restitution is not limited only to circumstances in which the victim requests restitution, and affirming a restitution award because the record established the loss).

We do not look at statutory language “in isolation.”

But the 30-day statutory deadline applies only to disputes about the amount or type of restitution, and, here, Rosillo challenges the district court’s authority to award the restitution.

2 As discussed below, we will consider a restitution challenge made outside of the 30-day time period under “the narrow circumstances” where the “only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution and that challenge was raised in the district court.”

In interpreting statutes, we do not “examine different provisions in isolation.”

In interpreting statutes, we do not “examine different provisions in isolation.”

d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011) (stating that appellate courts “do not examine different provisions in isolation” and instead “construe a statute as a whole, and words and sentences are understood in the light of their context” (quotations omitted)).

See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04- .046 (2024); -52 (Minn. 2011).

tification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later.” In State v. Gaiovnik, we recognized a narrow exception to this requirement, holding that a failure to object to a restitution award does not bar an appeal “where the only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution and that challenge was raised in the district court.”

See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04-.045 (2020); -52 (Minn. 2011).

d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011).

See, (stating that the 30-day time period in Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.

(stating that the 30-day time period in Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.

3(b) (“A defendant may not challenge restitution after the 30-day time period has passed.”); n.7 (Minn. 2019) (stating that arguments may not be raised for first time on appeal); (explaining that the statutory forfeiture rule applies to challenges to amount of restitution, not challenges to the court’s authority to order restitution).

(holding that a district court has authority to sua sponte order restitution under Minnesota Statutes sections 609.10, 611A.04, and 611A.045).

(concluding that statutory deadline a pplies to preclude review on appeal when offender disputes amount or type of restitution).

This 30-day ti me limit does not apply, however, where the “challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution.”

Rather, we must “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions.” (“[W]e do not examine diff erent provisions [of a statute] in isolation.”).

As noted, statutory provisions are not intended to be interpreted in isolation, and we examine their words and phrases “in the light of their context.” State v. Gaiovnik , 47 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

State v. Gaiovnik , (M inn.

Subbert’s position is supported by State v. Gaiovnik, where the supreme court reversed this court’s decision that the appellant “waived the right to challenge the restitution award” because he “did not submit a written request for a hearing on the restitution issue.”

We “do not examine different provisions in isolation.”

See State v. Gaiovnik , (stating that we must not “examine diffe rent provisions in isolation,” but instead should read “ [w]ords and sentences .

In interpreting statutes, we “do not examine different provisions in isolation.” State v. Gaiovnik

However, the 30-day time limit does not apply under the “narrow circumstances” where the “only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution and that challenge was raised in the district court.”

But this requirement does not apply when the “offender 8 challenges the district court’s legal authority to award restitution.”

In other words, we do not view the statute's words and provisions in isolation, State v. Gaiovnik , , 647 (Minn. 2011), but instead interpret the statute as a whole, so that nothing is superfluous, State v. Boecker , , 351 (Minn. 2017).

See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04-.45 (2016); -52 (Minn. 2011).

(examining a defendant’s challenge to the district court’s legal authority to award restitution when the victim had not requested restitution).

In State v. Gaiovnik , the supreme court concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to award restitution, stating that th e offender “was on notice prior to and during trial” of the requested restitution and that both he and th e district court “were aware of [the victim’s] loss, and [the offender] has never contested the amount of the loss.”

But the affidavit requirement does not “apply when the dispute is over the court’s legal authority to order restitution.”

State v. Gaiovnik , , 647 (Minn. 2011).

v. Coons, (“[W]e do not examine different provisions in isolation.”).

See Minn. Stat. §§ 611A.04-.06 (2010); -52 (Minn. 2011).